WITH ARMENIA, RUSSIA´S TIES ARE SOUND / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

With Armenia, Russia’s Ties Are Sound

For now, there’s little sense of urgency to resolve a road dispute. 

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

One of the biggest reasons Russia invaded Ukraine is geographic security. 

Russia’s position is such that it needs to insulate itself from what it sees as potential threats on its frontier, and Moscow has spent a lot of time and effort trying to shore up its farthest reaches. 

Indeed, it had hoped that amid its military forays its other buffer zones would remain stable, but that hasn’t been the case, at least not in the Caucasus. 

The Lachin corridor, an important road connecting Armenia to the war-torn enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, has been blocked for months thanks to Azerbaijani protesters. 

Armenia has since criticized Russian peacekeepers for failing to fulfill their obligations to control the corridor.

This has called into question Russia’s relationship with its generally stalwart ally, especially as the West uses the spat to try to pry Armenia away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. 

And though there are some concerns, Russia remains confident in its position there.

For Moscow, the Caucasus is a strategically important region. 

The territories of modern Armenia and Azerbaijan separate Russia from Turkey and Iran, and they comprise an important transportation hub that facilities movement and trade in virtually every direction. 

Russia has managed to strengthen its position there in recent years in a variety of ways, the most important of which was its mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. 

This allowed Moscow to balance Azerbaijan and Armenia and, as important, insert its peacekeepers into the region. 

The Lachin crisis threatens to undermine Russia’s position. 

The corridor is essentially the only road linking the 120,000 ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to the outside world. 

Azerbaijani protesters blockaded the road in December ostensibly over environmental concerns, but many believe they are acting with the tacit support, if not at the behest of, the government in Baku. 

Either way, the blockade has disrupted the supply of food and medicine and has resulted in regular power outages. 

It’s no surprise, then, that Armenia believes Russia isn’t holding up its end of the bargain.

In response, Armenia has refused to conduct exercises with the Collective Security Treaty Organization on its territory, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of the organization. 

But more important, the government in Yerevan has said it has no choice but to seek help from outside partners. 

Its foreign minister suggested that G-20 countries pressure Azerbaijan to intervene directly, and the European Union has already created a civilian mission in Armenia.

All this would seem to suggest that Russia is too preoccupied in Ukraine to effectively manage its affairs elsewhere, and that its relationship with Armenia is in peril. 

Yet, this is hardly the case. 

Armenian economic ties with Russia, especially in the energy sector, will be extraordinarily difficult to replace. 

Even before the conflict, Moscow was Yerevan's key economic and investment partner in the region: Trade turnover with Russia in 2021 was $2.6 billion, which accounted for 34 percent of Armenia's imports and 27 percent of its exports. 

Economic ties only intensified in 2022, when the Armenian economy grew 13 percent thanks largely to Russian migrants and the growth of trade and parallel exports. 

Human capital in the IT sector increased by 25 percent, according to the head of Armenia’s national bank. 

The service sector has already shown significant growth: From January to August, the volume of services provided in the country increased by 27 percent compared with the previous year. 

Boding well for small business, Russians registered more than 2,700 companies in the country from February to August. 

In the first half of 2022, Armenian exports to Russia increased by 49 percent compared to the same period a year before. 

Imports grew by 42 percent.

 

No one understands better than Moscow what Armenia is trying to accomplish. 

The Nagorno-Karabakh war had already forced Yerevan to seek additional partners, and the government had improved ties with Turkey and the EU accordingly. 

Russia knows Armenia is merely trying to play Russia off the West to improve its own position, which is why Moscow doesn’t feel any particular sense of urgency to placate Yerevan. 

Moreover, Russia understands the limitations of other players in the region, especially those of the EU, which is simultaneously trying to shore up ties with Azerbaijan. 

The Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation is far from over, and for all the recent criticism about Russian inaction, Yerevan recognizes that it is Russia’s presence, not the EU’s, that guarantees the security of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Armenia doesn’t want to replace Russian support; it wants to supplement it. 

It’s only if Armenia goes too far that Russia will respond.

But even then, Moscow can’t afford to be drawn into another military conflict, so it's trying to ignore minor provocations. 

In a sense, Moscow strictly follows the rules of the Nagorno-Karabakh cease-fire: The only function of the peacekeepers is to control the Lachin road and make sure that no one is shooting anyone else. 

Empowering Russian peacekeepers to unblock the Lachin corridor could create a more complex conflict in the region and hobble relations with Azerbaijan – itself an important partner of Moscow’s.

Relatedly, the fact that Russia is taking its time in Armenia doesn’t mean it has lost its ability to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Yerevan sees the current blockade as retaliation for ruling out the construction of the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijanis living in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic to Azerbaijan proper. 

If that’s the case, then it could also be seen as an attempt to compel Moscow to convene a new round of talks, which could yield concessions on Zangezur. 

But this could play into Armenia’s hands: Amid Western sanctions, Zangezur doesn’t really benefit Moscow, and any attempt to create new transportation routes that bypass Russia could be a nonstarter.

The most likely outcome is that Russia and Armenia maintain their relationship, the intermittent outburst of indignation notwithstanding. 

Still, Moscow understands that with the EU sniffing around, the Caucasus requires more attention than it is currently able to give, especially in light of the war it started to its west.

Moscow can’t afford a second front.