IN LATIN AMERICA, JAPAN SERVES THE U.S., AND ITSELF / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

In Latin America, Japan Serves the US, and Itself

Tokyo has become a surprising linchpin of Washington’s anti-China strategy in the region. 

By: Allison Fedirka

The rivalry between the United States and China is complicated, to say the least. 

Washington and Beijing are two of the world’s largest economic and military powers, with interests in every region of the globe that are either reinforced or undermined by any number of political and economic policies, security alliances and informal partnerships. 

In turn, these interests can elevate the importance of seemingly inconsequential countries or regions, pit otherwise indifferent countries against each other, and spur new rivalries of their own.

That’s a long way of saying that Japan, of all places, has low-key become vital to America’s strategy to counter China in Latin America. 

China has spent years building inroads into the region to secure an array of commodity supplies critical to its economy. 

Leveraging Japan, a central cog in the U.S. alliance system in the Eastern Pacific, is merely part of Washington’s response. 

And Japan appears to be on board with the arrangement because it helps protect interests it shares with the U.S. and, as important, helps it secure its own.

Shared Interests

China’s strategy in Latin America is fairly straightforward: Throw billions of dollars at like-minded or vulnerable governments to secure rights over natural resources. 

Washington either can’t or won’t do the same, preferring instead to use private sector participation to help bring in the equivalent investment, financing and economic activity. 

But economies the world over are now dedicating massive amounts of resources to post-pandemic recovery efforts. 

Partners who can bring in additional funding have quickly become a premium. 

The countries most likely to step up are those with strong economies and relatively deep pockets, and who share U.S. interests and allies.

Enter Japan. 

From Jan. 4 to Jan. 12, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi paid official visits to Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 

Aside from Ecuador, these countries boast the largest economies in Latin America and are places with which Washington is trying to improve bilateral ties. 

Indeed, Hayashi’s political agenda for the tour clearly aligns with the U.S.' values, priorities and global vision. 

In several of his public addresses, he highlighted the need for networks that can uphold the rule of law, keep the state out of capitalism, and secure free and open maritime order. 

These concepts are almost identical to the values the U.S. invokes when it discusses the need to contain China.

The tour also reflects the U.S.-Japan alignment on economics. 

Hayashi’s advocacy for a better regulatory environment plays off the desire to find ways to undermine China’s ability to engage in financial and economic projects. 

By framing these changes as ways to, say, facilitate research and development or human resource development in Latin America, Japan is also trying to get these countries on board with its vision, and thus America’s vision, of the global economy.

Specifically, Japan and the U.S. share the view of Latin America’s potential to help create secure value and supply chains. 

The region (namely, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia) is home to large lithium reserves as well as copper and rare earth materials that can be used in batteries, microchip production and other high-value tech products. 

These products can be used in the automotive industry, where China has grown its market share in recent years and created more competition for major auto industries in the U.S., Mexico, Japan, Argentina and Brazil. 

Integrating Latin America into these supply chains facilitates Japan’s access to U.S. markets with lower logistical costs, and it supports U.S. near-shoring objectives. 

Japan has also prioritized digital transformation in its ties with Latin America, particularly in the area of information communication technology. 

Again, these efforts aim to present alternatives to Chinese services and tech like Huawei-supported 5G, which has been cited by the U.S. for potential security concerns.

National Interests

Japan isn’t merely doing Washington’s bidding, of course. 

It has reasons of its own to shore up ties in the region. 

Latin American countries play a secondary role in Japan’s future vision for economic prosperity and security. 

Tokyo seeks to promote free trade with the region, particularly through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the U.S. is not a part of. 

Japan’s economic strategy naturally favors Pacific Alliance countries like Chile that embrace free market principles more readily than others. 

In that sense, Latin America serves as the eastern flank of Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision. 

This geography fosters a potential security structure Japan could leverage in the future. 

Later this year, for example, Japan will invite government officials from Latin American countries for training on combatting unregulated, unreported, illegal fishing practices – which China is notorious for. 

Latin American countries along the Atlantic coast also help Japan extend its reach into the Atlantic and Africa, as evidenced by joint projects with Brazil in Mozambique and Angola. 

Even so, Japan’s interest in the region is even more fundamental than free trade agreements. 

Japan is increasingly seen as an emerging power, particularly lately with the developments in its self-defense forces. 

Any such nation that wants to project power must eliminate, or at least mitigate, critical and potentially destabilizing vulnerabilities, of which Japan has two: food and energy.

In recent decades, the Japanese government has been forced to devise strategies to reduce its dependence on food imports. 

Japan’s food self-sufficiency has steadily declined – present levels are approximately half of what they were 55 years ago – thanks in part to consumption outpacing production and to changes in the Japanese diet. 

The country has a 37 percent calorie-based self-sufficiency rate and 67 percent food self-sufficiency rate. 

(For comparison, the U.S. and France have food self-sufficiency rates well over 100 percent.) 

With the exception of rice and vegetables, it needs to bring in what it eats. 

Domestic production accounts for only about 20 percent of soybean consumption, 15 percent of wheat consumption, and 10 percent of beef consumption. 

The war in Ukraine and increased instances of compromised crops worldwide have made food security all the more urgent. 

To that end, Tokyo hopes subsidies and new technologies will increase domestic production, and that its flirtations with Latin America will offset what it cannot produce. 

 Japan’s alliance with the U.S. appears strong for now, the government needs to make sure it has diversified food suppliers in the future, especially as old suppliers go offline and as competition among buyers increases. 

As for energy, Japan is even more dependent on imports. 

The country has no major hydrocarbon reserves and therefore ranks among the top five global importers of coal, oil and natural gas. 

Given the (more or less) fixed supply of hydrocarbons, the potential risks facing shipping lanes, and the inherent volatility in prices, Japan has every incentive to find alternative energy sources it has more control over. 

Tokyo seeks to have non-fossil fuels account for 60 percent of the country’s energy matrix by 2030. 

This means nuclear and renewables are expected to play an increasingly prominent role. 

Here, too, Latin American countries, particularly Brazil and to a lesser extent Chile, have much to offer in terms of renewable projects, exchanges and collaboration.

 

For now, Japan’s actions are in lockstep with Washington’s in Latin America. 

But as it grows more powerful, it will engage with other regions as it pursues interests outside its own region and outside the purview of the United States.