The Inevitable Battle for Kherson
Given the region’s strategic importance, neither side is willing to accept defeat.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
In September, Russia was caught off guard when Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in Kharkiv region in the northeast instead of Kherson region in the south.
Two months later, indications are that the Kherson offensive is all but ready for launch.
Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians late last month, declared martial law and accused Kyiv of planning a large-scale assault on the region soon.
Meanwhile, Kyiv has made advances in recent weeks on the western bank of the Dnieper River, retaking dozens of villages and towns, striking ammunition depots and bridges, while Russia has attacked energy infrastructure and imposed martial law in eastern regions, including Kherson.
Though the timing of the strike still isn’t clear, it seems both sides are making preparations for the inevitable.
Why Kherson Matters
Located on the Black Sea and the strategically important Dnieper River, Kherson was one of the first major territories captured by the Russians after Moscow invaded Ukraine.
The region, about the size of Belgium, has served as the main gateway to the annexed Crimean peninsula and hosts the biggest port Russia has managed to control in southern Ukraine.
Before the war, it was a regional economic hub and home to a major shipbuilding industry.
The North Crimean Canal, the main water delivery system for the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula, also runs through Kherson.
Since February, thousands of Russian troops have been deployed to Kherson as part of Moscow’s push to advance into Mykolaiv and Odesa and seize southern Ukraine.
It has been a focal point for Kyiv for months, which is why the Kremlin was taken by surprise when Ukraine’s counteroffensive in September targeted Russian-controlled regions in the northeast instead.
Moscow has already lost Kharkiv – and as a result was forced to replace its army commander in charge of the war.
It can’t afford to lose Kherson, too.
But Russia is facing both logistical and personnel problems.
Its new recruits, acquired through the “partial mobilization,” will need to be trained fast to support troops already deployed to the region.
Still, the Russian military is fighting back near Kupyansk and Lyman, building defensive lines from both sides of the Siverskyi Donets River, and continuing offensive operations in Bahamut, Soledar and Ugledar.
It’s hoping this strategy will destabilize Ukrainian positions and avoid a concentration of Ukrainian forces near the Kherson region.
For Ukraine, one benefit of taking back Kherson is that it would push Russian forces farther away from other key locations in the south of the country, such as Mykolaiv and Odesa, as well as central Ukraine.
Kyiv could also then control the North Crimean Canal.
Without control over Kherson region, Russia can’t guarantee water supplies for its annexed peninsula.
Kyiv understands that taking away this capability from the Kremlin could instigate a political crisis in Moscow, which could weaken Russia’s resolve and its negotiating position in future talks.
Why the Evacuation Matters
Thus, news about the evacuation of Kherson should be taken seriously.
The evacuation was ordered on Oct. 19, just as fighting around Kherson city, the regional capital, intensified.
A few days later, on Oct. 24, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke with his counterparts in Britain, France and Turkey, and warned of an “uncontrolled escalation” from Kyiv.
The warnings came after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy expressed concern that Moscow was plotting to blow up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant in the occupied part of Kherson.
Russia then accused Kyiv of plotting to destroy the plant’s dam, and said the evacuation of civilians was necessary to protect them from the flooding.
The evacuation plan suggests two important possibilities.
First, Russia may be planning to withdraw from Kherson and wants to make sure it doesn’t leave anything important behind – i.e., Russians who were brought over to live in the occupied territory.
Second, Russia may actually be increasing its defense capabilities in the region, and wants to clear the area of civilians so the military can better prepare for battle, logistically and otherwise.
The first possibility, however, isn’t likely.
There are indications that Russian troops are pulling out of Kherson city: Some administrative buildings are no longer flying the Russian flag, and a Russian-installed official there said on Thursday that Russian troops would likely leave for the eastern bank of the Dnieper River.
But a full-scale withdrawal from the region is too risky for Moscow.
It would mean acknowledging failure on one of Russia’s most important objectives in the war: controlling Ukraine’s southern coast, including Kherson’s neighboring Mykolaiv region and Odesa.
Moreover, the Kremlin couldn’t tolerate the internal political backlash that would result from a full withdrawal, considering the strategic importance of the south.
Both countries are now likely facing a long battle ahead to control Kherson, with both logistical and geographic challenges.
The region is located in the Black Sea Lowland, much of which is covered in shrubs and forest, planted as windbreakers to shelter villages located among grain and corn fields.
In the summer, the Ukrainian military could hide from Russian artillery and drones in these forests. But it’s now November, and this tactic is no longer feasible.
Moreover, the two major rivers of the region – the Inhulets and the Dnieper – are used by the Russian military as natural defense lines, meaning Ukraine will have to fight in more populated areas to recapture the region.
Kherson, however, is mainly rural and one of the least populated regions in Ukraine.
It has just two urban centers: the capital and Berislav, a city of just 12,000 people that’s currently under Russian control, as is most of the west-bank of the Dnieper.
Fighting in a low-density area will present challenges for both armies.
In such areas, manpower and reconnaissance (i.e., drones and satellite intelligence) are key.
Russia will need a greater concentration of forces, and Ukraine will need capabilities that enable its army to advance covertly – in the dark of night, for example.
Going from village to village through open plains risks exposure.
Both armies will also have to contend with difficult weather conditions.
Heavy rain in the fall can make the terrain muddy and hard to penetrate.
Winter will also present challenges in terms of moving troops, tanks and equipment.
Long Battle Ahead
Reports suggest that Russia has been preparing for weeks for a Ukrainian offensive in the region.
Moscow has reportedly already sent some of its newly mobilized forces to the front line in Kherson.
It also reportedly fortified its trenches and positions underground.
Ukraine, meanwhile, has been advancing slowly and is likely considering attacking Russian positions elsewhere in the south to increase its chances of success in Kherson, though its ability to sustain heavy fighting in more than one location in the south is unclear.
Despite the apparent retreat of some Russian forces from the regional capital, a battle for Kherson can’t be avoided.
Considering the terrain and logistical constraints, it will be a long, grinding affair as neither side is willing to accept defeat.
To maintain its strategic advantage in the south, Russia could also resort to other tactics: escalating offensives in other territories, launching airstrikes or using tactical nuclear weapons in low-populated areas.
This may explain Kyiv’s hesitance in attacking Russian positions in Kherson.
It’s worried about what might follow if it succeeds.
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