THE FLANK OF WAR / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Flank of War

Thoughts in and around geopolitics.

By: George Friedman

The arena for the Russian-Ukrainian war is obviously Ukraine. 

But as in most wars, the main arena does not define the war as a whole. 

This war did not start with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

It has been underway for years as low-level pressure. 

It started intensifying in 2020.

As we have argued, Russia’s main goal is to create geographic buffers protecting its core from attack, particularly along historical lines of invasion. 

It is not always necessary to achieve political ends – and all wars have political ends through the direct use of force. 

Political ends can also be achieved economically, through covert action or threats. 

There is a basic principle of war: to attack an enemy on the flanks. 

Main force is usually concentrated on the center of the lines. 

The rear is difficult to reach. 

But the enemy’s flanks are likely vulnerable points where an attack, if successful, can break the opposing force.

The flanks are not only tactically significant. 

They can be strategically critical, protecting the nation itself by eliminating a line of attack; for the attacker, they create a line of attack, forcing the dispersal of defending forces and creating openings. 

For Russia, the first flanking attack occurred following a disputed election and protests in mid-2020 in Belarus, along the northern border of Ukraine, with its westward border blocking the North European Plain. 

It therefore meant that any attack from Poland, for example, would be blocked from Russia by force in Belarus, diverting the attack across Ukraine. 

It should be emphasized that a prudent strategist deploys forces based not on an appreciation of enemy intentions at the moment but rather based on possible actions. 

And for Russia, an attack by or from Poland was seen as possible, and closing that line of attack imperative. 

The solution was a soft intervention to help quell anti-government protests. 

The Russians cemented President Alexander Lukashenko in place and gained the opportunity to attack Ukraine’s northern flank.

The second area where the Russians sought to protect their flanks was in the South Caucasus. 

The South Caucasus was a line of attack used by Turkey through the centuries. 

Russia locked the area down by securing a settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that resulted in Russian peacekeepers deployed to the region, securing it from immediate threats.

The United States is now countering Russia’s southern flank defense. 

The Russian move was based on ending the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict and becoming the arbiter between them. 

With Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, this week, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited both Armenia and Azerbaijan, offering to mediate existing problems between them and obviously discussing energy in Azerbaijan. 

Georgia is already hostile toward Russia and relatively close to the United States. 

The U.S. is clearly seeking to create a solid, pro-American bloc in the South Caucasus and to force the Russians to be concerned about the North Caucasus and possibly divert forces there. 

Since this was a pathway of invasion at one time, and since the United States has the potential to act on it, Russia cannot ignore its southern flank.

At the same time, Russia is trying to build a flank to Ukraine’s southwest in Moldova. 

Moldova is an independent, Romanian-speaking country. 

Its politics are complex and unpredictable. 

Russia has sought to create a pro-Russian Moldova for quite a while, but in general it has failed to shift Moldova’s alignment. 

Now, the Russians are pressing harder, seeing a possible flanking maneuver in which they could threaten Ukraine from the south, in an area where conquest would mean the cutting of Ukrainian supply lines. 

The trick is to elect a pro-Russian government, perhaps offering Moldova a piece of Ukraine that would reduce Moldova’s vulnerability and dependence on Romania as an incentive. 

This would create a threat to Ukraine that would be difficult to tolerate. 

Romania, a U.S. ally, has tried to manage Moldova since the fall of the Soviet Union in an environment in which there was no significant war underway. 

Now, Russia has an overriding reason to try to prevail, and the U.S. has an overwhelming reason to block it. 

This flanking maneuver is sufficiently significant for a major Russian effort, while diverting Ukraine and the United States from more immediate demands on resources, simply in order to maintain the status quo.

The Ukraine war began with an attempt by Russia to ally with China and divert American attention from Europe. 

The attempt to force the U.S. into an Asian flank failed. 

One of the interesting things about flanking maneuvers in international affairs is that large-scale ententes tend to fail because the scale of powers is so large that it is filled with complexity. 

Flanking is a maneuver that requires agility. 

A major power can try to maneuver; a lesser power can at best ally with a major power, but it can rarely maneuver it into a desired position.

There are, of course, many other attempts being made to recruit nations by both sides of the war. 

But the flanking maneuver is different. 

First, it is a geographical position that is sought, so that countries in this discussion are all on or near the Ukrainian border. 

They pose a threat of military action that might affect the military reality inside Ukraine. 

The very threat posed by the flanking maneuver – the possibility of an attack – may force one of the combatants to redeploy forces needed for combat into a static position, weakening the force as a whole. 

Normal alliances can strengthen one side or another materially, but unless they’re contiguous they cannot directly threaten the other side. 

Getting Iran or New Zealand to declare their support might be satisfying and perhaps mean acquiring some equipment, but it would not shift anything.

The war appears to be static right now, although that can change at any moment. 

And when wars become static, changing the shape of the playing field becomes important. 

Right now both the Americans and the Russians are engaged in flanking maneuvers that could change the shape of the battlefield and put one side at a disadvantage. 

The longer the war lasts, the more the battle for the flanks will matter.