THE POLITICS OF SPORTS IN SAUDI ARABIA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Politics of Sports in Saudi Arabia

Riyadh is hoping its sports investments will bring not just prestige but also profits.

By: Hilal Khashan

As part of a push to diversify their economies away from fossil fuels, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have been making significant investments in sports events over the past decade. 

Last year, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund established a new golf league called the LIV Golf Invitational Series, as a rival to the Professional Golfers’ Association, a nonprofit North America-based organization. 

In response, the PGA suspended the membership of players who signed up to participate in the new league, and Europe’s DP World Tour fined and sanctioned members who took part in its London tournament earlier this month. 

Among the most famous defectors is Phil Mickelson, who admitted that the Saudis have a terrible human rights record but said this was a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to reshape how the PGA Tour operates.”

Amnesty International has described players who have signed contracts with LIV Golf as “willing stooges of Saudi sports-washing.” 

This term describes efforts to use sports to divert public attention away from a government’s controversial activities and improve its public image. 

Saudi officials emphasize that investments in golf and other sports, particularly soccer, are driven by a genuine passion for the sport rooted in a local sports culture. 

The fact remains, however, that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are reshaping the world of international sports and poisoning the environment in which professional players compete against each other.

Diversion Tactic

Soccer is the most popular sport in Saudi Arabia, with more than 150 soccer clubs operating in the country. 

In 1956, the government established the Saudi Arabian Football Federation, during the peak of the Arab cold war, the surge of Arab nationalism, and the emergence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as a towering pan-Arab leader. 

During this time, the split between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal raised alarm within the kingdom. 

Universal political ideas began infiltrating Saudi society after thousands of expatriate Arab workers entered the country, leading to the emergence of a Saudi leftist movement influenced by the rise of oil giant Aramco, which had a liberalizing effect on the country. 

More alarming for the Saudi royals were rising demands to transform the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy. 

The government and the security establishment sought to deflect public attention away from politics, using sports as a diversion. 

Thus, the government introduced two annual soccer tournaments: the Crown Prince Cup in 1956 and the King Cup a year later.

More recently, the Arab Spring – and the possibility that the 2011 uprisings in Yemen and Bahrain could inspire similar revolts in Saudi Arabia – precipitated a dramatic increase in Saudi funding for sports events. 

In 2013, the Saudi Super Cup joined the growing list of major soccer events in the kingdom. 

In 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman abolished the Crown Prince Cup and replaced it with the Prince Mohammed bin Salman League.

Economic Motivations

Still, these investments are not meant as mere diversions. 

They have key economic motivations, rooted in part in the long-standing rivalry among GCC member states. 

Upon its establishment in 1981, one of the goals of the GCC was to integrate the economies of its six member states. 

However, instead of each country specializing in a different area of production and exchanging commodities, they replicated each other’s products and services, sharply reducing the possibility for economic cooperation. 

For example, if Saudi Arabia invested in a petrochemical complex, other GCC countries would build similar facilities, even if they were economically unviable because of the countries’ smaller populations. 

The competition extended to building ports, international airports, world-class airlines, universities and, eventually, sports endeavors.

In 2005, Qatar constructed Aspire Zone, a 250-hectare sporting complex in Doha. 

In 2010, it was announced as the host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. 

This triggered intense competition with the UAE and Saudi Arabia over who could attract more attention in the sports world. 

Whereas Qatar focused on sports as part of a soft power effort to place itself on the world map and keep politically aggressive neighbors with whom it had a turbulent history at bay, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh had economic motives.

Dubai’s Emirates Airlines acquired sponsorship rights for several football teams, notably Arsenal, the Asian Football Confederation and Real Madrid. 

Meanwhile, the UAE’s national carrier, Etihad, sponsored Manchester City, the HSBC Golf Championship and Formula One. 

Three years ago, Saudi Arabia hosted a boxing match between Anthony Joshua and Andy Ruiz at a cost of $50 million, ushering in an ambitious sports policy pivoting around its NEOM City project, a massive initiative under construction since 2019 that features an ultramodern sports city. 

Government officials are also considering founding a Saudi version of the FIFA World Cup.

Last year, Saudi Arabia acquired Britain’s Newcastle United for $400 million. 

Saudi Minister of Sports Abdulaziz Bin Turki said, “The sky’s the limit when it comes to hosting sports events.”

Sportswashing?

Many of Riyadh’s sports investments, including the LIV Golf league, are funded through its Public Investment Fund. 

Established in 1971, the PIF, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, manages $480 billion in assets. Some of its significant investments include the Saudi National Bank and the Saudi Telecommunication Co. 

It’s also in charge of the country’s ambitious mega-development project Vision 2030, at the center of which is the NEOM initiative. 

Saudi investments in LIV Golf, which total $2 billion, are part of the Vision 2030 campaign. 

While projects like these are partly motivated by a desire for prestige, they also have a financial value for Gulf Arab countries. 

LIV Golf, for example, can generate significant advertising revenue as a major sports event with internationally recognized players.

There’s no denying that the gruesome murder of U.S.-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi has tarnished the Saudi crown prince’s image and that he’s now on a campaign to rehabilitate his public persona. 

But it’s incorrect to claim, as some in the Western media have, that the investment in LIV Golf is merely an exercise in sportswashing. 

The criticism leveled at LIV Golf, mainly that Saudi Arabia is trying to obscure its poor human rights record, is superficial. 

Saudi Arabia is viewed unfavorably by citizens of most countries for reasons that go beyond human rights. 

Moreover, the controversy around LIV Golf mostly stems from the fact that it has abundant financial resources that enable it to outbid its rivals in attracting the world’s best players. 

The $25 million budget per event – with $20 million allocated for the 48 golfers and $5 million for the teams – makes LIV Golf highly lucrative for its participants. 

Some prominent players have even signed contracts to join the league for up to $200 million.

Golf is a popular sport in the developed world – one that, unlike soccer, is considered a luxury activity associated with the rich. 

LIV Golf’s real threat is in its ability to disrupt the status quo in a well-established industry. 

By attempting to attract the golf world’s best players as well as its fans and communities, LIV Golf threatens to monopolize the sport.

In Saudi Arabia, economic development does not hinge on sports or services. 

Vision 2030 doesn’t present any new or innovative plans to transform Saudi Arabia into a productive economy. 

The project’s three main themes – creating a vibrant society, a thriving economy and an ambitious nation – are implausible in a country where tribal divisions are rising, expatriates continue to perform all productive economic functions, and traditional values are still dominant. 

The kingdom is focusing on activities related to tourism and entertainment, including sports, that do not require the participation of Saudis themselves. 

Saudi Arabia may dominate the golf industry but will not bring modernity home.