The Battle Over Syria
The country has long been an arena of regional rivalry and foreign intervention.
By: Hilal Khashan
During the First World War, Britain and France agreed to partition the territory bordering northern Arabia, often called the Fertile Crescent, between themselves in anticipation of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse.
Their 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement dismembered the region, creating artificial states without foundations.
While the British held on to Iraq and Palestine, the French seized Syria, creating two improbable political entities: the modern-day countries of Lebanon and Syria.
All of the new countries were rife with political instability and ideological divisions.
Syria, however, stood out as the most troubling entity thanks to its religious diversity, ethnic divisions, regionalism, external loyalties and foreign interventions.
This piece tracks the country’s evolution as a state since its independence in 1946.
It demonstrates how foreign intervention immensely shaped its politics, making it an arena of regional contestation.
State, Society and Politics
The early 20th century saw the rise of intense Arab identity in Syria, which led the country to be known as the beating heart of Arab nationalism.
Initially, it emerged as a sentimental protest movement against the Ottomans’ attempts to Turkify Arabs.
But it remained largely an urban phenomenon and failed to develop into a unifying force of a population sharing a political vision and economic interests.
Syria emerged as a weak and fragmented state that lacked experience in self-rule.
For millennia, it was under the control of a succession of foreign rulers ranging from the Romans to the Byzantines, Persians, Mesopotamians and Muslim conquerors, first from Arabia and later from the Abbasids, the Seljuks and the Ottomans.
Demographically, Syria is a complex state that includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians.
It is also a patchwork of religious sects comprising Sunnis, Greek Orthodox Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Alawites.
From independence until its 1958 merger with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, Syrian politics underwent many changes.
The fledgling democracy failed because of the army’s intervention in its politics, leading to four military coups between 1949 and 1954.
The U.S. embassy backed the first coup by Army Chief of Staff Husni al-Zaim.
Four days later, the new government in Damascus agreed to allow the Trans-Arabian Pipeline to cross Syrian territory to reach two designated oil terminals on the Mediterranean, a move that the previous government had opposed.
Ideological divisions crippled Syrian politics as the Aleppo-based People’s Party sought union with the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan, while the pro-Egyptian National Party prevailed in Damascus.
The right-leaning and pro-Western Syrian Social Nationalist Party supported the country’s joining the Baghdad Pact before reemerging as a leftist party in the 1960s.
Its ideological nemesis, the Socialist Baath Party, championed the cause of Arab nationalism and union with Egypt.
Political conspiracy, assassinations, army politicization and the threat of a communist takeover drove Arab nationalist officers to fly to Cairo and pressure Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to unite with Syria and save it from turmoil.
The push for a merger occurred several months after Turkey threatened to invade Syria, claiming it had become a Soviet satellite state.
The Assad Dynasty’s Rise
For Syria’s urban Sunnis, military service was often seen as an unwanted burden.
They preferred to pursue careers in business and either paid their way out of conscription or completed only the mandatory two years of service.
But for the Alawites, Syria’s most economically disadvantaged sect, military service was seen as a career, providing them with an opportunity for social mobility.
As a result, they became overrepresented in the army and the officer corps.
The many coups led by Sunni factions, both successful and failed, led to purges that exacerbated the imbalance between Sunnis and Alawites.
In 1966, a successful coup brought three officers – two Alawites and one Druze – to power.
Before the end of the year, the two Alawites – air force commander and right-wing Baathist Hafez Assad and left-wing Baathist Gen. Salah Jadid – eliminated the Druze officer in another coup.
Assad became defense minister, while Jadid resigned from the military to become a powerful member of the Syrian government.
The striking absence of a Sunni officer among the new rulers ushered in a new era of Syrian politics, which eventually led to the popular Sunni uprising in 2011.
In 1970, Assad overthrew Jadid, and a year later ran uncontested for the Syrian presidency, winning 99.996 percent of the votes, according to official results.
Assad transformed Syria into an Alawite-run state, even though he surrounded himself with Sunni lackeys.
Under Assad, Alawites accounted for 90 percent of the officer corps, and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the army’s mission changed from preparing for conflict with Israel to defending the regime.
Assad sided with Iran during its 1980-1988 war with Iraq, supplying it with Scud missiles and allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to enter Lebanon in 1982 to establish Hezbollah.
Before his death in 2000, he removed all rivals to pave the path for his son Bashar’s succession.
Despite developing good relations with Iran, Hafez Assad maintained close ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
He also regulated Iran’s influence in Lebanon.
However, his son succumbed to Iranian influence, especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, leading to Iran’s penetration of Syrian society, military and foreign policy.
The 2011 uprising occurred by default in solidarity with those who overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as many Syrian Sunnis looked up to Egypt as a role model.
Iran and Russia
Bashar Assad’s militarization of the uprising backfired as the rebels seemed positioned to overthrow his regime.
He appealed to Iran for help, and the Iranians took advantage of the opportunity to expand their Shiite allies’ presence to more than 600 locations throughout regime-held territory.
But Iran’s IRGC and Shiite proxy forces were not faring well against the rebels, so Assad enlisted the help of the Russians, who provided major air support for the regime beginning in 2015.
Russian military advisers tried to rebuild the Syrian army, which had been shattered by war and defections, to help it become self-reliant and end its dependence on Iranian-backed militias.
But corruption and lack of discipline prevented the Syrian army from reorganizing.
It continued to depend on Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias to provide critical battlefield support for the Fourth Division, the regime’s only credible fighting force.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has redeployed its forces in Syria to safeguard its Tartus naval facility and Hmeimim air base.
This hasn’t changed the balance of power on the ground, however, because the IRGC provides most of the fighters and Russia’s contribution is limited to air raids, which often decide the outcome of battles.
Russia is keen to protect its military assets in Syria, believing it can’t afford to retreat militarily on all fronts.
Soon after launching the war in Ukraine, Russian fighter jets flew over Turkish-backed Syrian National Army positions, dropping flares to warn the group against attacking regime-controlled areas.
It also continues to build ties in the Middle East, presenting itself as a credible ally to the region’s despotic rulers, who view President Vladimir Putin’s leadership style as similar to theirs.
But it’s now likely to assume a defensive posture in Syria, especially as tensions between Iran and Israel rise.
Iran, meanwhile, has worked closely with Syrian security forces through its proxies to smuggle narcotics from southern Syria into Jordan for distribution in GCC markets.
The departure of the Russian police from the area has accelerated smuggling activities, for which the regime’s Fourth Division, commanded by Assad’s brother, Maher, has provided cover.
The most popular narcotic, counterfeit captagon, is widely manufactured in Syria.
Drones ship the more expensive heroin and crystal methamphetamine over the heavily guarded border, where clashes frequently occur between the smugglers and the Jordanian army.
The Jordanians have warned that if the Syrian government doesn’t rein in the smugglers, they could launch a major military operation across the border to stem the trade of illicit goods.
Ending the War
The implications of Russia’s diminishing role in Syria largely depend on whether the Biden administration has the motivation to fill the vacuum.
Given Washington’s reluctance to become directly involved in the Syrian crisis, the anti-regime opposition needs to convince the U.S. that post-war Syria will emerge as a pro-Western oasis of peace.
Since invading Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has changed its tactics in the Middle East, opting to use sanctions to change the behavior of governments that do not support its policies instead of overthrowing them.
It also supports the U.N.’s special envoy to Syria in his bid to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
Russia’s predicament in Ukraine coincides with Western pressure on Assad to bring about national reconciliation and cooperate with the secular Syrian opposition.
Assad has been adamant about resisting genuine political reforms, including power-sharing and administrative decentralization.
He instead embarked on a comprehensive policy of demographic change, banning the return of refugees and demolishing entire neighborhoods.
But changes in the international environment forced Assad to reconsider his political recalcitrance and accommodate the opposition in order to stay in power.
Assad’s visit to the United Arab Emirates in March aimed to rehabilitate his regime amid a regional drive – led by the UAE, Israel, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia – to resolve the region’s conflicts.
Syrian authorities have begun releasing thousands of prisoners ahead of the eighth round of U.N.-sponsored talks between government representatives and the opposition to agree on a new constitution for Syria.
Arab countries are pushing the two sides to reach a compromise deal in an effort to block Iran’s infiltration there.
An agreement on a new constitution could help Syria end the 11-year civil war and restore relations with Turkey and Arab countries, namely Saudi Arabia.
The invasion of Ukraine has pulled the Middle East into the West’s confrontation with Russia, despite regional leaders’ hope to maintain neutrality.
The Europeans now realize that they made a mistake by abandoning Syria when the Russians launched their military campaign there, believing the war had no impact on their collective security.
As Europe tries to wean itself off Russian energy, the Middle East will become increasingly important.
The prospects for ending the Syrian conflict seem more promising now than at any time since the uprising began.
Assad has the backing of most Arab regimes, which want him to strike a deal with Turkey to expedite international investment in Syria’s post-war reconstruction.
Turkey’s economic crisis and presidential elections next year have shifted the focus of its regional policy from confrontation to conciliation.
Though they have no issue with Russia’s role in Syria, Arabs and Israelis can’t tolerate Iran’s presence there and believe ending the conflict hinges on ending Tehran’s hold over the regime.
Israel has readied itself to deal with Iran’s expanding influence in the country.
Its recent military exercises, the largest in years, are aimed at sending a clear message to Iran that the Israeli military is ready to act if needed.
Israeli attacks on Iranian assets in Syria have increased noticeably since the beginning of the Ukraine war and are likely to accelerate.
And despite high-level visits between Iranian and Syrian officials, the Assad regime views the strikes favorably, believing that Iran has violated Syria’s sovereignty and sabotaged its relations with the Arab world.
It seems Tehran has overstayed its welcome.
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