REACTIONS TO FINLAND´S NATO MEMBERSHIP / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Reactions to Finland’s NATO Membership

Russia and NATO-member Turkey oppose expansion for different reasons.

By: Antonia Colibasanu

On May 15, Finland officially announced that it would apply to join NATO. 

The debate over whether it would do so had taken place for some time, but the decision was accelerated by Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine. 

Sweden reportedly will follow suit this week.

If the decision isn’t all that surprising given the circumstances, the reaction from Russia is – and it reveals much about Moscow’s limitations. 

Also surprising is the response from Turkey, which is opposed to Swedish and Finnish accession, even as their potential admission revives the alliance by creating a new containment line from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

Russia’s Reaction

Russia and Sweden don’t have much to do with each other, but Finland and Russia do. 

They share a massive border and have been friendly for years, thanks in part to Finland’s neutrality during the Cold War. 

This was made possible through a treaty they signed in 1948. 

In exchange for neutrality, the Soviet Union promised not to invade or turn Finland into a satellite state. 

At the time, it was imperative for Finland to maintain the integrity of its borders, lest it lose any more territory to Russia.

As a result, Finland and Russia have developed a fairly close relationship. 

Trade and investment have increased since the Cold War, particularly between southeastern Finland and northwestern Russia, while transit and transport have also grown. 

Economic ties suffered when Russia annexed Crimea, after which Finland joined in on EU sanctions against Moscow, but even then, some 60 percent of Finnish natural gas still came from Russia. 

Despite this, or perhaps because of this, Helsinki has grown increasingly wary of Russia's aggression since 2008 and has, like Sweden, enhanced its cooperation with NATO accordingly.

For its part, Russia has already said that it will take “retaliatory steps'' over Finland’s accession. 

In some ways, it has been hedging its bets in the event this day ever came. 

Since 2014, it has been modernizing infrastructure and investing in the settlements of northern Murmansk. 

On Feb. 28, just a few days after the invasion of Ukraine started, the regional government announced the beginning of another stage of construction and modernization and that about 3 billion rubles ($44 million) were allocated for the works in 2022 – a first for a region that hasn’t gotten much attention over the past decade.

NATO accession talks have made the Kremlin’s plans more urgent. 

On April 13, President Vladimir Putin tasked the Defense Ministry with handling these modernization efforts, ordering that they be finished by 2024. 

The Murmansk region, where about 724,000 people live, is the location of Russia’s northern navy's main base, which consists of five military camps and 12 settlements with a population of roughly 150,000. 

Considering the total budget for the program is estimated at 78 billion rubles (and since it had been allocated before sanctions took effect), it is likely that the Northern Fleet will be beefed up.

Another option for Russian retaliation is economic. 

Cutting energy supplies is something that Russia will consider judiciously – Moscow needs the money, and it can’t afford to look indifferent to the plights of the 30,000 Russians who live there. 

Hence why Russia acted measuredly on May 14 in cutting electricity supplies to Finland citing payment delays, which opens the door for negotiations later.

But it may not matter as much later as it does today. 

Finland currently receives about 10 percent of its electricity consumption from Russia, but it has been working on shoring up its own production. 

And though 60 percent of its natural gas comes from Russia, natural gas accounts for only about 5 percent of Finland’s total energy consumption. 

The country’s main sources of energy are nuclear power (roughly 33 percent of total consumption), hydropower (22 percent), and biomass (17 percent).

A more effective way to hurt the Finnish economy is for Russia to “weaponize” St. Petersburg. 

The port there dominates regional shipping, helping to handle Finnish cargo that Helsinki cannot accommodate. 

More, most of Finland’s foreign investment in Russia is concentrated in St. Petersburg. 

The Russian government could increase pressure on the Finnish companies operating in Russia, thus making them rebrand their business, sell their key assets or even renounce their business in Russia. 

In an extreme scenario, Russia could nationalize Finnish assets before investors begin the long and arduous process of divesting from a fairly integrated economy. 

However, Moscow would be reluctant to do so since it may also lose other investors who may reconsider their investments in a country that's willing to nationalize private assets.

The Turkey Factor

Whatever Russia decides, it certainly has the time to consider its options. 

For a country to join NATO, it needs to receive a formal invitation. 

And though NATO leadership has been openly inviting both Sweden and Finland to join, a formal invitation depends on the consensus of current members.

Enter Turkey. 

The day after Finland announced it would join NATO, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he opposed expansion, citing concerns over the presence of “terrorists” in both Finland and Sweden. Turkey has long complained that Sweden doesn’t consider the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) a terrorist organization. 

Ankara has condemned the fact that the Swedish foreign minister criticized Turkish operations in northern Syria and met with members of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the PKK’s Syrian arm, in 2020.

Ankara has also criticized Finland for joining military sanctions against Turkey. 

The sanctions were imposed by the United States after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400 missile defense systems, and though they are mainly about limiting American military sales to Turkey, they also limit credit that would benefit Turkey’s military industry, something that cuts into the European-Turkish development of advanced weapon systems. 

In general, NATO and its allies have been concerned that integrating the S-400 into allied systems could compromise NATO’s security and have limited their technological sales and cooperation with Turkey. 

Finland and Sweden both have enhanced their security partnerships with NATO, participating in joint exercises and, by doing so, establishing common interoperability infrastructure.

Even with the tense relations between Turkey and Finland and Sweden, Ankara’s reaction to their accession surprised NATO and its member states. 

The U.S. State Department spoke to Ankara nearly immediately after Erdogan came out against expansion. 

Turkey has long complained of insufficient cooperation from NATO in its fight with the PKK and blocked a NATO defense plan for the Baltic region in 2019 over the bloc’s refusal to label the YPG as a terror group in its official documents. 

But it also took a step back in 2020 after NATO met some of its conditions and supported the Baltic defense plan.

But Turkey’s posture shouldn’t be all that surprising. 

Ankara has maintained a balanced strategy over Ukraine, looking for a middle ground. 

While it has supplied Ukraine with drones and has shut its straits and air space to Russian military ships and aircraft, Turkey was criticized for doing too little, too late, so as not to upset Russia, which could easily retaliate against Turkish interests in northern Syria. 

All that makes Turkey willing to maneuver so that it accommodates some of Russia’s behavior. 

Its negotiating posture within NATO allows it to ensure some small gains for itself, further growing its posture as a regional power.