THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UKRAINE WAR / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Role of Nuclear Power in the Ukraine War

It’s an important source of Russian leverage. 

By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

Russia’s ultimate goal in invading Ukraine is to bring as much of the country as possible under Moscow’s influence, or, absent that, to pry it away from the West. 

One of the more overlooked strategies to that end is to deprive Ukraine of traditional energy sources in the central and eastern parts of the country. 

Moscow is particularly keen to take control of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and uranium deposits.

Put simply, Russia wants to beat the West to the punch of monopolizing Ukraine’s nuclear industry. 

Doing so, it hopes, will prevent Ukraine from ever being a nuclear power and, as important, keep Ukraine dependent on Russia for energy needs, creating new options for power sourcing in areas of Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine’s east.

Nuclear Inheritance

It wasn’t that long ago that Ukraine's nuclear weapons potential was greater than Britain’s and France’s. 

It housed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, designed specifically to target the United States. 

In the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Kyiv pledged to become a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear-free principles. 

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, it pledged to give up its weapons in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S., the U.K. and Russia. 

This was no small thing: At the time, the government in Kyiv possessed nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads and some 2,500 tactical warheads – all holdovers from the Soviet era.

Indeed, Ukraine possesses, at least theoretically, all the requisite institutions to restore its nuclear power status. 

It inherited massive scientific and technological research and development from the Soviet Union. 

Ukraine can potentially produce rocket launcher systems, solid propellant engines, rockets, and fuel and necessary software for them. 

The R&D center of nuclear studies in Kharkiv has an experimental nuclear facility. 

(Russia accused Ukraine of creating enriched uranium there.) 

Until recently, Ukraine has been operating four other plants: the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and Chernobyl.

Unsurprisingly, Ukraine relied heavily on nuclear power for its energy consumption. 

Before the war, the share of nuclear power was between 40 percent and 51 percent, and 27 percent came from thermal power stations located mostly in central and eastern Ukraine. 

Until the invasion, Ukraine still received nuclear fuel for its power plants from Russia. 

(Spent fuel is also problematic; Kyiv sent its waste to various Russian facilities.) 

Ukraine has reserves of nuclear fuel that will last until at least the beginning of next year.

It’s little wonder, then, that Ukraine has started to reconsider its stance on nuclear weaponry. 

Discussions to that ended started when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, but they never got far. 

The invasion of the rest of Ukraine has revitalized the issue. 

At a recent conference in Munich, for example, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that if the Budapest Memorandum guarantor states won’t convene and guarantee Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, then Kyiv will become a nuclear power again.

Access to uranium isn’t a problem. Ukraine has some of the largest reserves in the world – about 1.8 percent of global deposits. 

Ironically, only a few months before the invasion, Kyiv announced plans to produce enough uranium to meet its nuclear energy needs. 

It was as much a political decision as an economic one: Kyiv needed to wean itself off its fuel dependence on Russia, and it had a hard time affording oil and gas for its thermal power plants. 

More, after the war in Donbas in 2014-15, Kyiv lost access to its primary coal mines. 

To offset these losses, Ukraine diversified its energy resources, eventually including nuclear. 

In 2021, Ukraine planned to start the process of domestically producing zirconium dioxide – an important component of nuclear fuel.

Ukraine’s decision is in keeping with global trends. 

Nuclear energy is having somewhat of a renaissance as many countries consider it the ideal response to the global energy crisis. 

Countries with large uranium mines may be able to provide their own energy. 

Russia wants in on the party and is thus trying to enhance its footprint in nuclear-generated electricity at Ukraine’s expense. 

Russia is already a leader in enriched uranium production, and if it were to wrest control of Ukraine, it would certainly restore uranium mining and production.

Leverage

Of Ukraine’s five nuclear plants, Russia gained control of Zaporozhe and Chernobyl (though Russian troops recently abandoned the one at Chernobyl) and is approaching the South Ukraine plant. 

So far, this has not changed the energy balance in the country. 

All produced electricity from these two plants continues to be a part of the Ukrainian energy system.

Even so, it became clear at the outset of the war that because the shortest route for Russian forces to Kyiv went through Chernobyl, Russia would occupy the region and would, according to Ukraine, initiate different types of provocations and blackmail the West with the threat of nuclear disaster. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that though it is concerned about Chernobyl and Zaporozhe, both are still “operating safely and securely.” 

(The agency recently said it plans to visit Zaporozhe.)

But it’s unclear how long that can last. 

Russian forces entered the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant on March 4 after clashes with the Ukrainian army. 

Both stations are now operated by Russian specialists from Rosatom, together with Ukrainian personnel. 

For Moscow, it would be dangerous for Ukraine’s entire nuclear network to fall into the hands of the West. 

But, as important, the network is a valuable source of leverage, especially in the face of imminent defeat. 

After all, what’s to stop Russia from destroying it on its way out?

The future of the rest of Ukraine’s nuclear plants is uncertain, but it is clear that in the upcoming weeks Russia will try to reach and occupy the South Ukraine plant. 

Anticipating as much, Ukraine has already fortified and reinforced the area. 

It’s hard to imagine that Russia will try to attack western Ukraine, where two nuclear plants are located, but if worse comes to worst, Russia won’t shy from destroying them or using them against the West to soften the blow of a defeat.