Public demonstrations against
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko have intensified. Looked at
casually, it seems unlikely that his presidency can survive. If the
protesters are as dedicated as they appear, then Lukashenko has run out of
maneuvering room. The only solution to an intense and long-term resistance
is an armed force that will shoot into the crowd. Since the protests have
gone on for weeks and that hasn’t happened, the demonstrators’ calculation
is that it won’t happen.
Lukashenko’s only option to remain in
power, therefore, is to change the game His meeting with Russian President
Vladimir Putin in Sochi on Monday was an attempt to do just that and, along
the way, allow Putin to change his game as well.
Lukashenko has been skilled in preserving
Belarusian sovereignty and, by doing so, preserving his own power. At this
point, sovereignty is a luxury he may no longer be able to afford. Given
the limits of Belarusian forces to suppress the demonstrations,
Lukashenko’s last chance to survive is to trade sovereignty for real but
diminished power by entrusting someone else to put down the unrest. And the
most obvious potential partner is Putin.
Putin has, as we have written about extensively,
a central interest in integrating Belarus into the Russian sphere. Belarus
is not only a defensive asset for Russia, providing a buffer and strategic
depth against Western intrusions, but also an offensive threat, when in
Russian hands and housing Russian forces, to Poland, the Baltics and, in
the longer term, Slovakia. Putin does not intend to launch a war westward.
The odds of his losing such a war are too high to risk, and the result of a
loss would be unpredictable. For Putin, merely having the option of war
gives him political standing in Russia and a lever that could force
European countries to change their policies to accommodate Russian needs. Belarus would give Russia options, and strategic options are fewer in
practice than they might appear in theory.
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Putin has been maneuvering to dominate
Belarus for a long time, but Lukashenko has blocked him. Putin had little
to offer Lukashenko, and outright military occupation, although something
the Russians could succeed in doing, would resurrect NATO as an effective
fighting force and cause Germany to back off from stronger ties to Russia.
The latter two things took priority over Belarus, so Russia nibbled but
couldn’t act.
The Belarusian election and the
public's response give Putin the option to act. Rather than a hostile
intrusion, he would be coming at the request of the legally elected
president of Belarus, to stabilize a country of vital interest to Russia,
in a time in which Western agitators are creating a crisis for Belarus. Putin would not have to use force; the mere presence of Russian forces
would signal to the Belarusian demonstrators that the risks of protesting
suddenly increased. The Sochi talks helped establish steps in this
direction: Lukashenko suggested that Belarus’ future military drills, no matter
the size or scope, should include Russia, while Putin announced that Moscow
would be giving Belarus a $1.5 billion state loan.
Though it’s unclear whether the
poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was meant as a signal
to Belarus of what might come – and indeed, that seems too neat an
explanation – certainly a move on Belarus would be a signal to Putin’s own
opponents in Russia.
It’s also unclear how strong the
demonstrators are. We don’t know whether they could or would resort to armed
resistance, or if neighbors like Poland might help them. Measuring the
distribution of power between demonstrators and governments is one of the
hardest parts of geopolitics, because it is not geopolitical. Many years
ago, I underestimated the demonstrations in Iran, and failed to see that a
large faction of the Iranian army was standing beside the demonstrations.
But I also thought the crowds in Venezuela would bring down Nicolas Maduro. Measuring the passion of a crowd and the discipline of the police and
military is not easily done. And the tendency of politicians and pundits to
guess wrong is substantial.
This is something that Lukashenko and
Putin must calculate. Attacking a mass of people willing to face their
bullets would be devastating to both – for Lukashenko because he would lose
complete control of this people, and for Putin because he would lose
Europe’s support, which he badly needs.
Still, crowds often defeat powers that
are already collapsing, like the shah. So Lukashenko, with much at stake,
will offer Putin a lot. Putin, with much to gain, will be eager for the
benefit, but will be the more cautious of the two. He will want to take
control of Belarus without appearing to have violated its sovereignty. How
that works was likely after-dinner conversation.
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