Russian interests are being tested in the Caucasus and Levant.
By: Allison Fedirka
Two weeks ago, Russia concluded a constitutional referendum meant to shore up the power of the Kremlin and especially of Vladimir Putin. Under the revised constitution, which was approved by nearly 79 percent of voters, Putin can theoretically remain president until 2036 – by which time he would be in his 80s.
The move came not a moment too soon: Crises involving Russia-backed partners are erupting in the Levant and the Caucasus, not to mention the long-standing war in Libya, where Russia is a key player.
And as if that wasn’t enough, there are faint signs of anti-government unrest in Siberia. For a while, Russia has faced a number of serious economic problems, and we have been alert to signs of domestic destabilization.
Thus, any signs of domestic trouble, not to mention events on Russia’s periphery that threaten its strategic interests and raise the likelihood of high-stakes conflicts, are quick to grab our attention when they appear on our radar.
Domestic Instability
At its core, the internal threat for Moscow concerns the government’s ability – or inability – to maintain a basic standard of living for Russians after a sharp decline due to low oil prices, sanctions and, most recently, the coronavirus pandemic.
On July 11, a leading architect of the Russian economy, Alexei Kudrin, made scathing remarks about the government’s management of the economy in recent years. Kudrin called for structural and institutional reforms and highlighted how disappointing Russia’s economic growth has been since the fall of the Soviet Union, a period when output should have surged as the economy transitioned to capitalism.
This was one of the harshest recent critiques of the Russian economy, but it was far from the only one. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that economic difficulties lie ahead for the country, and Putin himself said Russian authorities need to act more decisively and make the economy more competitive, or risk becoming mired in an economic “swamp.”
Amid the coronavirus outbreak, the Kremlin is struggling to hide the country’s growth slowdown, stubbornly low exports, rising unemployment and declining real incomes from the population. Public dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation and government policy is rising, especially in those peripheral regions that are remote from Moscow.
These regions are mostly poorer and lack the infrastructure and economic diversity of the major urban centers. State welfare programs prop up the few areas with above-average incomes. Indeed, the results of the constitutional vote showed that the Kremlin is losing support in these regions: In the Nenets Autonomous district, which receives generous state subsidies and thus has the country’s second-highest incomes, 55 percent of voters opposed the draft changes.
Even farther away from Moscow, in Khabarovsk, which borders China, turnout was only 44 percent, and 36 percent of voters opposed the constitutional changes.
Khabarovsk is interesting for other reasons as well. On July 10, the region’s governor, Sergei Furgal, was arrested in connection with the attempted murder of two businessmen in 2004 and 2005. (He pleaded not guilty.)
The arrest has brought out protesters demanding the release of Furgal, who defeated candidates from Putin’s United Russia party to become governor in 2018, for several consecutive days.
According to official estimates, 12,000 people rallied in support of Furgal on July 11, though unofficial estimates put the number of participants nearly three times higher. Subsequent protests have apparently not reached the same scale.
The Kremlin is no stranger to large protests, but demonstrations of this magnitude usually occur in places like Moscow or St. Petersburg. The sheer size of the July 11 protest suggests a high degree of organization and logistical support; it would have been difficult to bring out as many as 35,000 people for a completely spontaneous demonstration. The protest is also notable for its cause; typical triggers for unrest are things like wage arrears, not allegedly politically motivated arrests of local officials.
A single protest in Siberia – even several days of protests – is hardly going to destabilize Russia.
However, what happened in Khabarovsk is enough of an outlier that – in combination with the country’s increasingly dire economic situation – it warrants Moscow’s attention, as well as our own.
The Caucasus
Besides domestic pressures, Russian interests are also under threat abroad. In a still-murky incident, Russian-led security forces on July 11 wounded and detained a Georgian citizen for unknown reasons in Georgian territory, near the border with South Ossetia, which Russia has occupied since 2008.
Detentions by Russian forces are not uncommon in this area, but the shooting of a Georgian citizen stands out as unusually aggressive. The Kremlin itself has not commented on the incident, but it did recently complete major military drills together with units of the local army in the territory of Abkhazia, which was also invaded by Russian troops in 2008.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has grown more antagonistic toward Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. On July 10, during a security council meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went beyond normal talking points of highlighting Armenia's claim over Nagorno-Karabakh and its strategic value to Yerevan.
Pashinyan also emphasized the need to be tough on foreign powers trying to influence Armenian affairs. The next day, there was gunfire along their shared border at Tovuz, far from Nagorno-Karabakh but nonetheless a common point of dispute.
Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry accused Armenia of violating a cease-fire and targeting civilians. Armenia said the attack targeted army engineering infrastructure and technical facilities.
Fighting resumed again on July 13.
This incident is notable because of Turkey’s reaction to it. The Turkish government, normally quiet over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, threw its support behind Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Turkey are long-standing enemies, so naturally Armenia accused Turkey of provoking instability.
Because the South Caucasus is a strategic buffer zone for Russia, tensions there naturally draw in Moscow. While Russia doesn’t need to fully control the South Caucasus to maintain territorial integrity, it needs to influence the area enough to reduce the risk of threats on its border.
Russia therefore tends to be a moderating force between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, working to ensure no major conflict erupts in the region. But with Turkey submitting an official position, Russia will have a harder time being the voice of reason.
Turkey’s involvement would force Russia to throw its support behind Azerbaijan since siding with Armenia would squarely position Russia against Turkey. Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Moscow has already warned of the potential for the situation to escalate into a major conflicto.
It may come to nothing, as clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh almost always seem to, but Turkey’s mere statement will make Russia uneasy.
The Levant
Finally, there is Lebanon, which is not geographically part of the Russian periphery but part of the periphery of Syria, which is an important Russian ally and recipient of Russian security guarantees. The country is experiencing its worst economic crisis since World War I.
Mass economic dislocation has shattered the middle class and has made food financially inaccessible for the majority of the population, many of whom now suffer from malnutrition.
Virtually every government effort to remedy the situation has failed. If things don’t improve, the possibility of national instability, even civil war, can’t be ruled out.
So why does this matter for Russia?
Because the Eastern Mediterranean is critical to Russia, and the Levant, and Lebanon’s position in it, is critical to the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia has parlayed its presence in Syria into an attempt to restore its image as a powerful military force. Security in Lebanon and in Syria have historically been intertwined.
During the Lebanese civil war, the Syrian army occupied Lebanon in 1976 to project influence, counter Lebanese and Palestinian guerilla groups that threatened the Assad regime, and act as a counterweight against Syria’s main rival, Israel.
Syrian troops withdrew in 2005, but Lebanon still serves as a buffer zone, with sectarian tensions, political gridlock and economic instability that create ripe conditions for foreign influence.
As Beirut weakens, outside powers will move in to protect and advance their interests. They cannot abide the uncertainty of political instability in Lebanon nor allow one country to acquire more power there at the expense of their own. In this kind of environment, it doesn’t take much for conflict to escalate.
Chaos in southern Lebanon may give Israel, for example, the opportunity it has been waiting for to move against Hezbollah. Hezbollah may see war as a better option over isolation and thus draw in Iran and Syria.
The U.S. and Russia would not be able to ignore it. The degree of cooperation between Israel and Russia, while variable, would rile the United States. Turkey would have an opportunity to make a play for influence in northern Lebanon where the location lends greater access to the Mediterranean.
Maintaining control over its periphery has always been a challenge for Russia, but it’s not one it can ignore. Which puts Moscow in the position of managing four regions – one domestic, three foreign. Domestically, Russia faces a host of economic challenges.
This, combined with signs of brewing public unrest, raises the possibility of regional disintegration and thus is a major threat to Moscow. Whether or not these same forces will be reckoned with through political settlements or military conflict remains to be seen.
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