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Summary 
The 2014 Winter Olympics. The 1945 Yalta Conference. Anton       Chekhov’s 1899 story “The Lady With the Dog.” These are but a few       testaments to the enduring geopolitical and cultural significance of the       Black Sea. But the region’s history isn’t all sports, seaside romances       and peace negotiations – far from it. Over the centuries, the Black Sea       has time and again been the focus of competition and conflict as its       littoral states, namely Russia and Turkey, vie to protect critical       security interests there. These powers and others have fought over, won       and lost territory in and around the sea – some of them more than once.       And as Russia’s interventions in the Crimean Peninsula and in Georgia       attest, the struggle is alive and well in the 21st century. This Deep       Dive will look at why the Black Sea and its surrounding shores have been       the subject of so much strife and how the power distribution among its       littoral states today propagates the cycle of conflicto. 
  
 
Water Worth Fighting For 
Of the six states that border the Black Sea, Turkey and       Russia are primarily responsible for the course of the region’s       development over time. The two have spent most of their history in a       bitter rivalry, despite their recent alliance of convenience over       short-term endeavors, such as the war in Syria. Over hundreds of       years, the Russian and Ottoman empires fought numerous wars – each of       which traced back in one way or another to the issue of territorial       control of the Black Sea. 
 
In terms of geography, the region offers plenty of       features worth fighting over. The Bosporus and Dardanelles straits –       which connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, and from there to the       Aegean, the Mediterranean and the wider maritime world – have inspired       several battles for their control. During World War I, for example,       Ottoman and allied British, Australian and French forces fought over the       Dardanelles at Gallipoli. On the opposite side of the Black Sea lies the       Sea of Azov, situated between Russia and Ukraine. The Don and Kuban       rivers flow into the sea, linking it to the Russian heartland as well as       the Caucasus. Connecting the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea at the tip of       the Crimean Peninsula is the Kerch Strait, the site of a newly       constructed Russian bridge and a recent dustup between Russia and Ukraine.       The Black Sea itself is no less strategic than the waterways that       surround it. The Dniester, Dnieper and Danube rivers flow into the sea       and have made for strategic transit routes dating back to Ottoman times. 
  
A History of Violence 
Conflict between Russia and the Ottomans dates back to the       16th century, but the competition began in earnest only toward the end of       the next century. At the time, Russia faced threats on multiple fronts.       To the west, there was Poland, which had gone to war several times with       Russia in the 17th century and even occupied Moscow during a particularly       tumultuous period in Russian history. To the south were the Tatars, who       controlled the Black Sea and often conducted raids into Russian territory       on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. Russia signed a truce with Poland in       1667 that gave it control of Ukrainian territory east of the Dnieper       River. Russia also gained control of Kiev, strategically positioned on       the river, for two years and wanted to make it permanent. 
 
At the time, Poland was at war with the Ottomans. Having       pushed them out of Vienna, Poland, along with its allies in the Holy       League (which included the Holy Roman Empire and the Venetian Republic)       tried to drive the Ottomans back out of Eastern Europe. Russia, which had       cordial relations with the Ottomans in the recent past, initially       stayed out of the war but ultimately decided to join the fight in       exchange for Poland ceding control of Kiev beyond the initial two-year       arrangement.  
  
The effort had strategic benefits beyond putting a stop to       the Tatar raids. The main objective of Peter the Great’s rule was to       catch Russia up with Western Europe so that it could compete as an       economic and military power. Gaining greater access to the outside world       was a critical part of this endeavor. And for that, Russia needed a       reliable year-round port, unlike Arkhangelsk, its biggest port up until       that point, which lay so far north that its waters stayed frozen much of       the year. St. Petersburg, established in 1703 on the Gulf of Finland, eventually       drew much of Russia’s maritime traffic, but it, too, froze in the frigid       winter temperatures, as did the Neva River that flowed into it. To obtain       a true warm-water port, Russia would have to look south. 
 
Russia seized control of the Sea of Azov in its operation       in the late 17th century, beginning the gradual erosion of Ottoman       control of the Black Sea. But the area was traded back and forth between       the Russians and Ottomans for over half a century. Russia lost control of       the Sea of Azov in a short war with the Ottomans in 1710-11 and then       regained partial access in another conflict from 1735 to 1739. It was       granted the right to build a port there but was not allowed to sail its       naval fleets on either the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea 
 
It wasn’t until the Russo-Turkic war of 1768-74 that       Russia ousted the Ottomans from their post on the sea. The Treaty of       Kucuk Kaynarca, which ended the conflict, enabled Russian fleets to move       freely in the Sea of Azov, through the Kerch Strait and into the Black       Sea. It granted the Crimean Khanate independence from the Ottoman Empire,       making it a smaller, weaker foe and, in effect, securing Russia’s Black       Sea coast. The treaty also declared Russia the protector of Christians in       the Ottoman Empire, a position it used repeatedly in the following       centuries to justify wars with Turkey, and set an enduring precedent for       Russian intervention in defense of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and       the Caucasus. 
 
But for all Russia’s efforts over time to control the       Black Sea, the strait that links the body to the seas beyond, the       Bosporus, has always stayed beyond its grasp. The Bosporus has been and       remains Turkey’s ultimate point of leverage over Russia. Russian vessels       can sail the Black Sea all they want, but without Ankara’s consent, they       can’t leave it. This is no idle threat for Russia. During World War I,       the Ottoman Empire crippled the Russian economy by cutting Russian       commerce off from the Mediterranean through a blockade of the Bosporus.       Turkey wielded that power as a critical part of NATO’s containment line       in the Cold War, keeping the Soviet Union hemmed in at the Black Sea. 
 
Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, the contest for the       Black Sea region has continued. Ukraine’s independence in 1991 introduced       the possibility that the country would align with the West, an       intolerable risk for Russia – and one the 2014 Euromaidan uprising in       Ukraine has only reinvigorated. Today, Russia supports separatist groups       in eastern Ukraine and has reasserted its control of the Crimean Peninsula,       which it annexed nearly five years ago. It also built a bridge across the       Kerch Strait with such a low clearance that it prevents Ukrainian vessels       from passing; Russia detained several Ukrainian sailors in November after       a confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian naval vessels in the       strait. If Russia escalates its intervention in Ukraine,       Turkey may face a difficult choice between allowing NATO forces into the       Black Sea, counter to the terms of the Montreux Convention (which governs       access to the Bosporus Strait), or defying its allies in the bloc by       denying their passage through the Bosporus. 
  
  
Though Russia’s naval base at Tartus, Syria, gives it       access to the Mediterranean, it’s of little concern to the Turks. Under       its agreement with Syria, Russia can deploy up to 11 warships at the       base. Moscow has also been investing in support infrastructure to house a       larger flotilla there. But the base doesn’t present much of a threat to       Turkey because, in case of a war, Russia would still need to bring       supplies to the base through the Turkish-controlled Bosporus. 
  
 
The Competition for Other Shores 
Ukraine isn’t the only Black Sea state that has weathered       competition between Russia and Turkey. The two powers have also vied over       the centuries for control of the South Caucasus region, including       Georgia. Georgia’s strategic value is its role as a buffer along Russia’s       southern border. 
 
Just over a decade ago, Russia invaded the former Soviet       republic, an otherwise minor player in the region’s maritime activities.       Georgia at the time was considering a bid for NATO membership. It was       also dealing with a separatist uprising in the territory of Abkhazia,       which broke away in a war in the early 1990s. Russia intervened on       Abkhazia’s side, and by the end of its dayslong war with Georgia, it       recognized the territory, as well as the breakaway region of South       Ossetia, as an independent state. It has occupied the two territories       ever since. Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia gives it access to a few       additional ports on the Black Sea: Sukhumi – Abkhazia’s capital and main       port – Ochamchire, Gagra and Novy Afon. 
  
The remaining littoral states of the Black Sea – Bulgaria       and Romania – are also part of the competition between Russia and the       West. Today, they are NATO members, but their ties to Russia and Turkey       date back centuries. Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Warsaw       Pact. Long before that, though, the Russian and Ottoman empires struggled       for dominance over the states. 
 
Most recently, Bulgaria has been caught in a competition       over energy supplies between Russia and Ukraine. Bulgaria depends on       natural gas pipelines that run from Russia through Ukraine, and when       Moscow cut supplies to Ukraine in 2009, it didn’t receive enough natural gas       to meet domestic demand. The construction of the TurkStream pipeline,       which runs through the Black Sea, will enable Russia to use natural gas       supplies as leverage over Ukraine without jeopardizing the access of       importers down the line, including Bulgaria and states in Eastern and       Southern Europe. Bulgaria is even planning to invest about $1.6 billion       in the construction of an additional link to Turkey, the pipeline’s       terminus and, as such, an essential partner in the TurkStream endeavor.       (As the only alternative route to European markets, the pipeline also       gives Turkey some leverage over Russia, though Russia is Turkey’s top       supplier of natural gas and, therefore, still has the upper hand in this       regard.) 
  
  
Earlier in its history, Bulgaria was embroiled in a more       violent regional struggle, as Russia and the Ottomans fought cyclical       wars, including the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war. The peace deal the two       powers reached in that conflict, the Treaty of San Stefano, granted       Russia so much territory that Germany intervened to mediate a solution       more palatable to Europe. An ascendant Russia, after all, would have       posed enough of a threat to the weaker Austro-Hungarian Empire to upset       the balance of power on the Continent. (Were Austria-Hungary to fall,       Germany would have no ally to its east to help fight or insulate it       against Russia.) The revised agreement, the Treaty of Berlin, vastly       curtailed Russia’s land acquisition and turned Russia against Germany,       leading to the Franco-Russian alliance and laying the groundwork for       World War I. It also established Bulgaria as an independent state for the       first time since the Ottomans conquered it in 1396. 
  
In the years that followed, conflict in the Balkans,       including the discord that gave rise to World War I, frequently       distracted Bulgaria from its Black Sea interests. And as a NATO member,       Bulgaria plays a modest role in the region, hosting a small contingent of       Italian jets and four U.S. military bases, one of which Washington plans       to upgrade this year, investing about $5 million. 
 
Romania, by contrast, is home to a substantial NATO force       at its air base in Constanta, where the Danube connects with the Black       Sea by way of a canal. The base, which regularly houses an armored       brigade combat team, is the only installation in the Black Sea region       that supports U.S. forces, according to Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former       commander of the U.S. Army Europe. For missile defense, Romania has       installed the Aegis and Patriot systems and recently placed its second       order in two years for more of the latter system. (The Danube itself is a       possible vulnerability for Romania, though it’s also a potentially       important transport link for commerce. NATO’s bombing campaign against       Serbia in 1999, for example, destroyed several bridges along the Danube,       forcing the river’s closure and costing Romania hundreds of millions of       dollars in lost trade.) 
 
For centuries, the multiple axes of competition in the       Black Sea have made it a site of repeated conflict over the same       strategic passages. The contest has been most pronounced between Russia       and Turkey, which have fought countless wars to secure access to the       Black Sea and its surrounding waters. Threats from the West have driven       Russia to intervene in Ukraine, which can draw Russia into conflict with       Turkey. Whether the competition manifests in Russian military       intervention or in energy disputes, the struggle continues to this day. | 
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