ITALY DEMOSTRATES THE WAY TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY´S DEMISE / THE FINANCIAL TIMES OP EDITORIAL

Italy illustrates the way to liberal democracy’s demise

Complacency about the rise of populists is typical of failing political systems

Wolfgang Münchau


The League leader Matteo Salvini, who is looking to take Italy out of the euro © AP


Comparing today’s populists and nationalists to the Nazis and fascists of 80 or 90 years ago is pointless. But I see much clearer parallels between the fall of Germany’s Weimar Republic and the vulnerability of Europe’s liberal elites. Some of the current defenders of the liberal order are making the same mistake as, for example, the German Centre party of the early 1930s, by underestimating the scale of the threat that they face.

Harold James, a professor of history at Princeton University, has recently given us 10 reasons why our political systems today share some of the self-destructive characteristics of the Weimar Republic. One is the strength of the economic shock. Another is an excessive optimism about the power of constitutions to protect the system.

I would like to offer some additional thoughts on the role of complacent narratives — the stories we tell each other that make us feel better. As a commentator on eurozone affairs, for example, I keep hearing that an Italian exit from the euro cannot happen because it is not allowed. Italy’s constitution, for example, makes it impossible for a government to rescind international treaties by referendum.

This argument not only overestimates the power of constitutional law to protect us from illegal acts by governments, as Prof James pointed out. It also ignores the circumstances under which a country would leave the eurozone. All its government would need to do is engineer a financial crisis, declare force majeure, and introduce a parallel currency over a long bank holiday weekend. There is nothing in the Italian constitution to prevent a financial crisis or to stop a government from giving people the means to buy food.

This is also why it does not matter why the Italian coalition agreement no longer contains a formal euro exit clause, as it did in an earlier draft. We know that Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, wants to create conditions for a euro exit. We also know that some, though not all, members of the Five Star Movement, their potential partners in government, want that too.

That is all we need to know.

Another argument is that the financial markets would frustrate such a rebellion. Those who make it again commit the error of attaching the mindset of a centrist politician to that of Italy’s new leaders. Centrists, in Europe at least, have an emotional need to be considered fiscally conservative. Centrists look at bond spreads the way deer stare at headlights. To someone such as Mr Salvini, a financial crisis is not a threat but a promise, one that allows him to pull the plug on euro membership.

A third argument is the supposedly super-human ability of the Italian president to prevent disaster. Italy’s constitution has (wisely) given the president strong powers. The president has the right to appoint ministers and can refuse to sign legislation deemed incompatible with the constitution. But presidential mandates are finite, and even a strong president such as Sergio Mattarella cannot tell MPs and senators to pass a eurozone-compliant budget.

A fourth argument is that the centre will always be able to stitch things up. Really? I recall the attempt by the Democratic party and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia last year to change the electoral system in their favour. They miscalculated the sheer scale of support of the populists. You cannot save liberal democracy through gerrymandering.

The centrists are now resorting to the hope that the politically rehabilitated Mr Berlusconi could once again strengthen their hand. I see no evidence for this view. And what does it say about Italian politics if its future could only depend on the man who is primarily responsible for the country’s economic disaster?

Fifth, I hear it said that, if all else fails, there is always the European Central Bank. Mario Draghi, its president, saved the eurozone in 2012, but can he save liberal democracy? His main anti-crisis tool, a programme known as Outright Monetary Transactions, is irrelevant in this case. OMT was designed for rule-compliant governments that find themselves under a speculative attack by investors. That is not the case here.

Finally, there is the hope that the economic recovery will benefit the centrist parties. I think the opposite is the case. Five Star and the League will generate a recovery through a large fiscal stimulus — and will gain the credit for it. They are in power precisely because the centrists have failed to deliver on the economy. The truth is that there is no such thing as a technical backstop for liberal democracy.

Herein lies the main lesson of the Weimar Republic. If liberal democracy fails to deliver economic prosperity for a sufficiently large portion of the population over long periods, it ends — along with the financial and economic institutions it has created.