THE BUDGET CRISIS AND AMERICAN POWER / THE WALL STREET JOURNAL OP EDITORIAL ( VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED READING )

OPINION

JULY 29, 2011.

The Budget Crisis and American Power

We can afford the big stick we need if we're more careful about using it.
.
By GEORGE MELLOAN

Ronald Reagan famously said that no nation has ever been attacked because it was too strong, but that maxim is often forgotten. This seems to be the case now, as both the White House and some residual isolationists on the right propose measures to withdraw the U.S. from its global security commitments.


Barack Obama's performance as commander in chief leaves much to be desired. A skillful tactician doesn't aid a tenacious enemy (the Taliban) by announcing a timetable for quitting the field. He doesn't enter a war (Libya) and then withdraw as if he were sitting down after throwing out the first baseball. He doesn't damage his credibility by issuing unpersuasive threats (Iran). He doesn't diss a long-time strategic ally (Israel). He doesn't make concessions to "reset" relations with Russia and get nothing in return. And so forth.


America's foreign policy hawks are rightly critical of such conduct. Fearful that the president's uncertain trumpet will embolden enemies and distance friends, they deplore the planned troop drawdown in Afghanistan and other measures to reduce the U.S. military's forward presence. They argue correctly that the U.S. has been the primary architect of a global order that has fostered free commerce and political and social advances of great benefit to the U.S. and the world at large.


But there is one big problem: The U.S. is busted. That's not primarily because of its foreign policy engagements, which have been a good investment. It is mainly because America's political leaders have overburdened the productive sector with social obligations that cannot be fulfilled.


Sadly, when budgets are stretched, U.S. politicians usually don't menace entitlements, which buy votes. Instead they look to cut military and foreign policy expenditures. The consequences are often dire.

Japan attacked a militarily weak U.S. in 1941. The Ayatollah Khomeini thumbed his nose at a Vietnam–benumbed U.S. in the 1970s and the Iranians have been picking at us ever since. The jhadists began their assaults in the 1990s, when the U.S. was reaping the "peace dividend," and ultimately brought their war to the U.S. itself in September 2001.


U.S. military spending is already in relative decline, particularly when you subtract the rising costs of veterans benefits and the maintenance of existing equipment. A June study from the Council on Foreign Relations projects that the U.S. share of global military spending will fall to 39% in 2015 from 41% in 2010, and the overall military spending by the U.S. and its NATO and Asian allies will drop even faster, to 66% from 72%.


Certainly the U.S. could pursue its foreign policy objectives at far less cost than it does now. Government is inherently wasteful. Yet even as we cut fat, it is important to rethink how we use the muscle that remains.


America's primary need since World War II has been to learn how to fight unconventional wars and thereby promote the spread of freedom and democracy in benighted places like the Middle East. This means learning to work in troubled areas with political forces who aspire to those objectives. If that can be done effectively, it can obviate massive military action.

A model of sorts was the initial U.S. endeavor in Afghanistan. George W. Bush felt it politically necessary to respond quickly to the 9/11 attack by Afghanistan-based al Qaeda terrorists. There wasn't time to crank up the big battalions, so the CIA and U.S. special forces were dispatched to work with dissident northern tribes to overthrow the odious Taliban regime that had harbored Osama bin Laden.


Using high-tech communications, they targeted Taliban troops for B-52 bombing and sent them into retreat. In eight weeks, the Taliban had been driven out of every major city, including the capital, Kabul. Three years later, Afghanistan was able to hold a free election, at which point there were fewer than 15,000 U.S. troops on the ground.


Had the U.S. held to more limited objectives, training an army and a police force to secure the new democratic government rather than sending in U.S. troops to destroy the last holdouts of the Taliban, Afghanistan would have been less costly in American treasure and lives. Although no one knows for sure, it is plausible, especially given the unpopularity of the Taliban, that the elected Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, would have fared just as well or better, and the U.S. would have achieved its limited goal, a secure and U.S.-friendly Afghan government.


This is not an argument against "nation building." It's an argument for doing it smarter and with greater patience. The expensive deployment of thousands of U.S. troops too often relieves the client-country leaders from the urgency to build their own security forces and internal political alliances. Well-trained U.S. advisers can help speed the process at little cost.


Bringing officers from local forces to the U.S. for training and the experience of democratic rule also is a low-cost way to strengthen alliances. If Egypt remains in the U.S. camp after Mubarak, the training given Egyptian officers in the U.S. and the resulting friendly contacts with U.S. officers may be a more important factor than the billions of dollars of aid the U.S. has supplied that country.


Another saving would be cutting foreign economic aid, which is usually funneled to the politicians of countries that are in trouble because of incompetence, arrogance or greed of those same politicians. Promoting private trade and investment is the best way to strengthen a national economy, and that costs the U.S. government almost nothing.


The political trick is to maintain a strong military, with a continuing emphasis on developing advanced weapons and techniques, while at the same time applying greater discretion in its use. It is not easy to keep a powerful force in readiness while at the same time keeping it to clearly defined and limited goals. But if the U.S. is to survive the coming budget crisis without severe damage to its political influence in the world, it will need a smarter foreign policy.


Mr. Melloan, a former columnist and deputy editor of the Journal editorial page, is author of "The Great Money Binge: Spending Our Way to Socialism" (Simon & Schuster, 2009).
.
Copyright 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved