Remove the scourge of conflict
By Martin Wolf
Published: April 26 2011 20:08
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Man is a violent animal. This has always been so. But recently humanity has made progress in reducing large-scale conflict both among countries and within them. The exception is among the poor. Yet this is not a calamity that originates only from the poor or affects only the poor. On the contrary, both the origins and the impact of conflicts are global.
First, happily, the direct impact of war and civil war is in decline. While the number of countries experiencing civil war is in the mid-30s, battle deaths have fallen from an average of 164,000 a year in the 1980s to 42,000 in the 2000s.
Second, violence has mutated, not disappeared. Even the categories blur: fighters may be terrorists, insurrectionists, criminals or any combination of the three. The political and the criminal are closely connected.
In places as varied as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Papua New Guinea, El Salvador, Kenya, Tajikistan, the Philippines, the Balkans and Northern Ireland, conflict has included insurrection, intergroup strife, gang warfare, organised crime or even global ideological warfare.
Third, conflict spills over borders, with devastating effects: the Congo is just one example. In today’s world, every country borders on every other. Rich countries provide money, markets and weapons that motivate and aggravate violence in poor ones. Countries rich in resources that can be illegally trafficked are far more likely to suffer civil war than others. In reverse, the conflict inside Somalia has spilt over into global piracy. Trafficking of people and smuggling of drugs or guns are the seamy side of globalisation.
Fourth, violence has complex domestic and international causes: high unemployment, inequality, economic shocks and infiltration of trafficking networks or foreign fighters. But the central aspect is the “absence of legitimate institutions that provide citizens security, justice and jobs”.
Poor countries are both the most vulnerable to these ills and have the governments with the least ability to address them.
Fifth, once mass violence becomes embedded, it is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate. More than 90 per cent of the civil wars of the 2000s occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the past 30 years. Civil wars have too often been followed by criminal violence. Central America is just one of a number of worrying examples. It takes at least a generation to overcome the effects of civil war on society. About 1.5bn people – almost a quarter of the world’s population – now live in countries grievously damaged by such cycles of political and criminal violence.
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Sixth, violence is very costly. The naval operation to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean is estimated to cost between $1.3bn and $2bn annually, quite apart from the need to reroute ships and pay more for insurance. Thirty-five per cent of Latin American, 30 per cent of African and 27 per cent of eastern European and central Asian businesses view crime as their biggest challenge. But, above all, countries afflicted by conflict and criminal violence fall far behind: no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved even one of the eight millennium development goals of the UN. The WDR notes the contrasting fate of Burundi and Burkina Faso. These had similar incomes per head 50 years ago. Today, strife-torn Burundi’s is 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s. Overall, poverty rates are more than 20 percentage points higher in countries affected by violence than the others.
Seventh, men do most of the killing, while women make up most of the refugees and victims of sexual violence. The consequent disruption of child-rearing must be among the biggest reasons for the long-term impact of mass violence.
What, then, is to be done?
Sensibly, the WDR recommends walking before running: so restore confidence in collective action before more ambitious interventions. Then try to transform the institutions that provide security, justice and jobs. Meanwhile, outsiders should seek to reduce sources of external stress. One such source is drug prohibition, on which the report contains an excellent debate. The anti-prohibitionist wins, of course.
The report refers to five lessons of successful transitions. One is to build “inclusive-enough” coalitions for change. Another is to deliver early results. Yet another is to make reform of security and justice institutions a priority. Another again is to be pragmatic. The last is to recognise that this will be a long and bumpy journey: we may only know if Iraq has succeeded by 2040.
This also leads to five suggested tools: support bottom-up links between the state and civic society; recognise the connection between police and justice; create jobs; involve women; and act against corruption. This is banal. But what is obvious is almost always hardest.
International assistance should also be changed. The most important recommendation here is the first: invest in prevention. By the time violence has broken out, it is too late. Once it has, assume one will be engaged for decades. To act effectively, external institutions will also need to deliver support that is better integrated at one time and over time. They will need to look at the regional and global context. Finally, they will need to employ the available experience of countries that have struggled through these trials.
When one looks back over our thinking on development over the past six decades, what is striking is the broadening of perspective. This used to be seen as an economic challenge. But it is also a political, social and institutional one. Mass violence destroys all hopes of progress. We should make a huge effort to eliminate this scourge. It seems feasible. It is desirable. So try.
.
Man is a violent animal. This has always been so. But recently humanity has made progress in reducing large-scale conflict both among countries and within them. The exception is among the poor. Yet this is not a calamity that originates only from the poor or affects only the poor. On the contrary, both the origins and the impact of conflicts are global.
.
Taming mass violence is the theme of the World Bank’s latest World Development Report, which focuses on “conflict, security and development”. It is a fascinating document. Unfortunately, it is also far too long to obtain the attention it deserves. As I know from personal involvement in the first WDR, published in 1978, Robert McNamara, then president, believed these reports should be punchy and accessible. Excluding the annex table, the first WDR, which included what later became a separate report on the world economy, was 68 pages. The latest has 301 pages. Mr McNamara was right: less is more. But this report does have crucial messages.
Taming mass violence is the theme of the World Bank’s latest World Development Report, which focuses on “conflict, security and development”. It is a fascinating document. Unfortunately, it is also far too long to obtain the attention it deserves. As I know from personal involvement in the first WDR, published in 1978, Robert McNamara, then president, believed these reports should be punchy and accessible. Excluding the annex table, the first WDR, which included what later became a separate report on the world economy, was 68 pages. The latest has 301 pages. Mr McNamara was right: less is more. But this report does have crucial messages.
First, happily, the direct impact of war and civil war is in decline. While the number of countries experiencing civil war is in the mid-30s, battle deaths have fallen from an average of 164,000 a year in the 1980s to 42,000 in the 2000s.
Second, violence has mutated, not disappeared. Even the categories blur: fighters may be terrorists, insurrectionists, criminals or any combination of the three. The political and the criminal are closely connected.
In places as varied as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Papua New Guinea, El Salvador, Kenya, Tajikistan, the Philippines, the Balkans and Northern Ireland, conflict has included insurrection, intergroup strife, gang warfare, organised crime or even global ideological warfare.
Third, conflict spills over borders, with devastating effects: the Congo is just one example. In today’s world, every country borders on every other. Rich countries provide money, markets and weapons that motivate and aggravate violence in poor ones. Countries rich in resources that can be illegally trafficked are far more likely to suffer civil war than others. In reverse, the conflict inside Somalia has spilt over into global piracy. Trafficking of people and smuggling of drugs or guns are the seamy side of globalisation.
Fourth, violence has complex domestic and international causes: high unemployment, inequality, economic shocks and infiltration of trafficking networks or foreign fighters. But the central aspect is the “absence of legitimate institutions that provide citizens security, justice and jobs”.
Poor countries are both the most vulnerable to these ills and have the governments with the least ability to address them.
Fifth, once mass violence becomes embedded, it is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate. More than 90 per cent of the civil wars of the 2000s occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the past 30 years. Civil wars have too often been followed by criminal violence. Central America is just one of a number of worrying examples. It takes at least a generation to overcome the effects of civil war on society. About 1.5bn people – almost a quarter of the world’s population – now live in countries grievously damaged by such cycles of political and criminal violence.
.
.
Sixth, violence is very costly. The naval operation to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean is estimated to cost between $1.3bn and $2bn annually, quite apart from the need to reroute ships and pay more for insurance. Thirty-five per cent of Latin American, 30 per cent of African and 27 per cent of eastern European and central Asian businesses view crime as their biggest challenge. But, above all, countries afflicted by conflict and criminal violence fall far behind: no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved even one of the eight millennium development goals of the UN. The WDR notes the contrasting fate of Burundi and Burkina Faso. These had similar incomes per head 50 years ago. Today, strife-torn Burundi’s is 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s. Overall, poverty rates are more than 20 percentage points higher in countries affected by violence than the others.
Seventh, men do most of the killing, while women make up most of the refugees and victims of sexual violence. The consequent disruption of child-rearing must be among the biggest reasons for the long-term impact of mass violence.
What, then, is to be done?
Sensibly, the WDR recommends walking before running: so restore confidence in collective action before more ambitious interventions. Then try to transform the institutions that provide security, justice and jobs. Meanwhile, outsiders should seek to reduce sources of external stress. One such source is drug prohibition, on which the report contains an excellent debate. The anti-prohibitionist wins, of course.
The report refers to five lessons of successful transitions. One is to build “inclusive-enough” coalitions for change. Another is to deliver early results. Yet another is to make reform of security and justice institutions a priority. Another again is to be pragmatic. The last is to recognise that this will be a long and bumpy journey: we may only know if Iraq has succeeded by 2040.
This also leads to five suggested tools: support bottom-up links between the state and civic society; recognise the connection between police and justice; create jobs; involve women; and act against corruption. This is banal. But what is obvious is almost always hardest.
International assistance should also be changed. The most important recommendation here is the first: invest in prevention. By the time violence has broken out, it is too late. Once it has, assume one will be engaged for decades. To act effectively, external institutions will also need to deliver support that is better integrated at one time and over time. They will need to look at the regional and global context. Finally, they will need to employ the available experience of countries that have struggled through these trials.
When one looks back over our thinking on development over the past six decades, what is striking is the broadening of perspective. This used to be seen as an economic challenge. But it is also a political, social and institutional one. Mass violence destroys all hopes of progress. We should make a huge effort to eliminate this scourge. It seems feasible. It is desirable. So try.
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Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011.
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