The J-curve hits the Middle East
By Ian Bremmer
Published: February 16 2011 20:28
No one could predict that the death of a Tunisian vegetable vendor would spark revolts across the Middle East, threatening regimes from Libya to Iran. But while these shockwaves might seem chaotic, they are in fact only the latest example of a powerful political phenomenon: the J-curve, or the dip in stability as countries move from closed to open societies. The concept also explains why many of the region’s governments are now caught in what may prove to be an inescapable trap.
The theory goes like this. If you plot the relationship between a country’s stability (on the vertical axis) and its social and political openness (on the horizontal axis) the points that mark every possible combination of openness and stability will produce a pattern that resembles the letter J. Most countries start off closed and stable (think: North Korea). Many end up open and stable (like Britain). But in between there is a turbulent transition. Some governments, such as post-apartheid South Africa, survive this transition. Others – the Soviet Union, Iran under the shah and the former Yugoslavia – do not.
This presents a dilemma for the Middle East. In recent years, globalisation has provided more young Arabs with access to education, media and travel – innovations that make it more difficult for a ruling elite to control information and power.
If governments, such as Egypt’s, relax their grip to stoke economic growth (by opening their societies to deeper integration with the outside world) they risk sharp social and political upheaval. Yet if they keep things closed, they sharply limit the power of their economies to generate the prosperity on which longer-term political legitimacy will depend. And that too creates instability.
The J-curve is a controversial idea. When I first floated it in 2006, it was used – in some ways hijacked – by those seeking to explain the unstable postwar environment in Iraq. But an intervention bringing democracy by force was always a poor example of the theory. The current upheavals in the Middle East, the result of internal dynamics of populations trapped between economic hardship and increasing political openness, make a much better test.
Most regimes in the Middle East and north Africa have tried to remain stable by cutting off their citizens from the modern world. Globalisation’s progress has been slow across the region. But over the past decade these efforts have come undone. People have taken up mobile phones, watched satellite television and switched on Facebook and Twitter.
Autocratic governments, in turn, have had to expend more and more effort containing these potent weapons of free expression.
It is true there are obvious counterexamples to this trend. Some strongly authoritarian regimes have avoided significant domestic pressures, because strong economic growth has effectively pushed up the entire J-curve.
After 30 years of state-directed growth, China is under much less internal political pressure than the Middle Eastern regimes. Nonetheless, China’s leadership is keenly aware that economic success is required to maintain the regime’s survival – an implicit admission that openness and order remain in tension underneath.
Given the Middle East is unlikely to see a new economic miracle, what should its pressurised leaders do? They face two options. Those with the most isolated populations can repress them, hoping to stay on the left of the curve. Leaders of Algeria, Iran and Yemen now ride to and fro upon tigers that they dare not dismount, as Winston Churchill once put it. Ultimately, that is a dangerous ride – as Tunisia’s Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali can attest.
But opening up reform – the Jordanian route – is risky too. It costs King Abdullah little to replace one prime minister, but new faces alone will not create jobs or prosperity. Real reform will be much riskier, as it requires a surrender of some state control. King Abdullah must now calculate whether he is more likely to survive as a real reformer or as the man who kept the genie in the bottle for another year.
No countries are watching Jordan more keenly than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and a currently restive Bahrain. Unrest in their neighbour will make all three more cautious about allowing citizens to speak their minds. With oil and gas to export – and smaller populations with which to share the spoils – these three are actually better placed to begin sweeping reform. But, looking back to Tunisia, even the region’s richest now know a single spark can ignite a country. Even those who can best afford the instability that accompanies the depths of the J-curve may be too fearful to begin the journey.
The writer is the president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011
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