By Philip Stephens
Published: January 28 2010 20:23
When General Stanley McChrystal first unveiled his counter-insurgency plan for Afghanistan my initial reaction was that the US was getting serious about defeating the Taliban. My second thought, all of 60 seconds later, was that it was time to pull out. In setting out what he needed to stabilise Afghanistan, the Nato commander had exposed the gulf between the grim facts on the ground and the political fatigue in the US and Europe.
The war in Afghanistan is beset by a confusion of ambitions. Gen McChrystal’s surge is calculated to underscore the west’s resolve to defeat the Taliban. The expressed eagerness of Nato governments to hand over the fighting to Afghan forces invites a strong suspicion that they are heading towards the exit. Extending olive branches to the Taliban makes strategic sense. It could also be a cloak to cut and run.
The tension was exposed when President Barack Obama announced he was sending an extra 30,000 troops only on the understanding they would soon start returning home. The US had sufficient political will for one more heave. Beyond that, it was making no promises.
The purpose of this week’s London conference was to emphasise the positive by demonstrating broad Afghan and international support for Nato’s counter-insurgency strategy. The inconvenient fact that Hamid Karzai bought his re-election last year has been put to one side. “He’s the only Afghan president we have,” is how one senior US diplomat puts it. Mr Obama, this official conceded, made a mistake when he talked about an “exit strategy”. The phrase has since been expunged from the US lexicon.
In keeping with the studiously upbeat mood, Gen McChrystal told the Financial Times this week that after a year of costly setbacks, the Nato-led coalition in Afghanistan was poised to start pushing back the Taliban. For his part, Mr Karzai this week promised to clean up the corruption that has long tarnished his government. Germany’s Angela Merkel agreed to send more troops. The political and military strategies are to be put on the same track. A British diplomat, Mark Sedwill, has been appointed to a new role as Nato’s civilian co-ordinator.
The international coalition has simultaneously lowered its sights. The Bush administration talked about a shiny new democracy even as US forces allowed the Taliban to regroup by chasing after al-Qaeda. Gen McChrystal has a more realistic set of objectives.
The ambition is to nurture sufficient political capacity to allow Afghans to choose a government stable enough to lock out al-Qaeda. When the general talks about better governance, expanded economic opportunity and effective security it all seems pretty obvious. But it is worth remembering that these have been largely neglected goals. Only now are Nato forces prioritising the safety of the local population over the body counts of insurgents.
So far, so intelligent. Yet the jarring collisions of message are still there. Gen McChrystal couples his optimism about Nato’s military push with the suggestion that there is a place in the Afghan government for moderate Taliban leaders. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, observes that the Taliban are part of the “fabric” of Afghan politics. Other US officials say the international backing for Mr Karzai’s outreach programme to former insurgents was the most important headline from the London conference.
All these things are more or less true. Beating up the Taliban in the Pashtun heartlands of southern Afghanistan may force some at least to the negotiating table. The Taliban cannot be indefinitely excluded from a settlement.
Paying fighters willing to lay down their arms is a necessary precursor to reconciliation with more senior Taliban figures. As for the obvious inconsistency between stamping out corruption and bribing insurgents to shed their Taliban sympathies, well, life in Afghanistan has never been straightforward.
The trouble is that it is impossible to separate the new realism from the palpable eagerness of western governments to depart. Each affirmation of the west’s resolve is accompanied by a signal that it is looking for a quick way out. Talking to the Taliban makes sense. But talking now about talking to the Taliban raises the suspicion that the real aim is to accelerate withdrawal. What incentive is there for Afghanis to support the Kabul government if Nato is offering them only a temporary shelter?
The squaring of this circle, US and European officials will tell you, lies in the build-up of Afghan capacity. The transition, as it is called, will leave Mr Karzai’s government with an effective army and police force capable of fighting its own battles with Taliban irreconcilables.
But we all know that western governments are scarcely impressed by Mr Karzai’s performance thus far. The rigging of last year’s election was only the latest manifestation of the corruption that has been one of the hallmarks of his presidency. Only this week The New York Times published hitherto secret cables revealing the private doubts of Karl Eikenberry, the US ambassador in Kabul. Politely summarised, the cables describe Mr Karzai as weak and untrustworthy.
If the west now has a more plausible strategy that is not to say it is anywhere near comprehensive. Another of those bleak facts about Afghanistan is that, its own rivalries apart, it is also a locus for the bitter enmity between Pakistan and India. As long as this hostility persists, Pakistan will not act decisively against Taliban safe havens on its side of the Afghan border. Do western officials understand this? Yes. Do they have anything resembling a plan to promote Indo-Pakistani reconciliation? No.
Nato is undoubtedly better organised in Afghanistan. But that is not to say it can do more than prevent the Taliban from winning. The more the west talks about transition, the more Afghans will conclude it has its eye on the exit.
A little while ago I read an article by a Russian general arguing that, contrary to received wisdom, the Soviet Union did not suffer a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan. The Soviet-backed government of Mohammed Nasibullah, this general recalled, lasted for three years beyond Moscow’s withdrawal – inflicting at times heavy losses on the Taliban before it was eventually overwhelmed. I could not help wondering whether that is what the future holds for Mr Karzai.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.
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