By Roula Khalaf
Published: August 24 2009 22:05
“Resistance” has won; the US’s “blade is losing its edge day by day”. So declared Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, after a meeting with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, who turned up in Tehran last week to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad on his “election”.
For Iran’s top leader, the Syrian president’s visit was an opportunity to claim that, despite the turmoil over the June 12 presidential vote, the biggest threat to the Islamic Republic since its founding, it was business as usual in Tehran. His words were meant as a warning that no one should be under the illusion that the Islamic system has been weakened by its internal troubles.
It is, of course, no longer business as usual in Tehran. Whatever tricks the regime plays – a continuing crackdown on the opposition, show trials replete with reformists’ “confessions” of a plot, or threats to arrest reformist presidential candidates – Iran has been radically altered by the election crisis.
When it turned so brutally against its own people, the regime lost much of its domestic legitimacy. When outrage against the election outcome emanated from senior regime figures and clerical circles, it blew away the aura of undivided authority so assiduously nurtured over the past few years, as Iran’s influence in the Middle East has widened.
Whether the splits in the regime and the internal unrest can be taken advantage of is the question now being explored by western powers, whose primary objective remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sadly, the western approach to the election crisis has been characterised by confusion and hesitation from the start. Indignation over the repression and the outlandish Iranian claims of a foreign conspiracy was combined with repeated international signals that the regime is still an acceptable interlocutor, should it wish to talk about curbing its nuclear ambitions.
Now that Mr Ahmadi-Nejad has been inaugurated, more serious international business lies ahead. Next month world powers will start discussing whether new sanctions should be imposed if Tehran fails to enter into meaningful negotiations over its nuclear programme.
The US has said it wants the Islamic Republic to show willingness to negotiate over its nuclear programme by September – which means an Iranian response to the set of proposals that world powers have put forward, offering economic and political incentives in return for a halt to uranium enrichment.
When Barack Obama arrived at the White House, a bigger prize was added to the offer: the prospect of a normalisation of relations with the US. Also encouraging were the hints that have emerged from Washington that the US could live with limited uranium enrichment in Tehran if trust between Iran and the west could be established. But the election drama has further complicated the chances of normalisation. The ability of Mr Obama to sell – domestically and to a certain extent also internationally – a more flexible attitude towards uranium enrichment has also been undermined.
The question that will be raised is how Washington could hope to build trust with a regime beset by internal infighting and obsessed with conspiracies, whose intentions are increasingly difficult to read. Can the Iranian leadership, in its present, turbulent state, enter into negotiations or agree on a policy, even if it wanted to?
In the US Congress, meanwhile, patience with Iran is running out and pressure for new unilateral sanctions is mounting. In the Middle East, concern is building over Israel’s own intentions – and how long it will tolerate Iran’s nuclear progress before launching military strikes.
Some Iran watchers argue that the crisis could result in greater co-operation with the west out of a need to restore the government’s legitimacy. They point to the appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi, who has a reputation as a pragmatist, as head of Iran’s nuclear agency, as well as sudden signs of improved access for United Nations nuclear inspectors. Tehran recently allowed inspectors into a reactor that had been off limits for a year, and an upgrade of UN monitoring at the Natanz nuclear plant.
Yet the significance of these moves should not be exaggerated. Mr Salehi is not the point man on negotiations; his job is technical. The more open access for inspectors comes just ahead of a report on Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and could represent no more than an attempt to limit criticism.
What we may be witnessing, however, is a fresh Iranian effort to buy time on the nuclear front while its leaders try to put their house in order. For years Iran has cleverly played the nuclear game, failing to heed international demands but providing just enough hints of co-operation to persuade Russia and China to block crippling measures at the UN Security Council.
The election disaster has made the western ability to respond to Tehran’s moves trickier. Inaction is dangerous because it could encourage Israel to launch a military adventure. Rushing to impose new sanctions, particularly on petrol imports, is also risky.
Iranians, who will bear the brunt of the punishment, might turn more fiercely against the government. But more pressure could also backfire, giving Tehran an excuse to blame foreigners for domestic problems and fulfilling Mr Khamenei’s wish of a return to business as usual.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
For Iran’s top leader, the Syrian president’s visit was an opportunity to claim that, despite the turmoil over the June 12 presidential vote, the biggest threat to the Islamic Republic since its founding, it was business as usual in Tehran. His words were meant as a warning that no one should be under the illusion that the Islamic system has been weakened by its internal troubles.
It is, of course, no longer business as usual in Tehran. Whatever tricks the regime plays – a continuing crackdown on the opposition, show trials replete with reformists’ “confessions” of a plot, or threats to arrest reformist presidential candidates – Iran has been radically altered by the election crisis.
When it turned so brutally against its own people, the regime lost much of its domestic legitimacy. When outrage against the election outcome emanated from senior regime figures and clerical circles, it blew away the aura of undivided authority so assiduously nurtured over the past few years, as Iran’s influence in the Middle East has widened.
Whether the splits in the regime and the internal unrest can be taken advantage of is the question now being explored by western powers, whose primary objective remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sadly, the western approach to the election crisis has been characterised by confusion and hesitation from the start. Indignation over the repression and the outlandish Iranian claims of a foreign conspiracy was combined with repeated international signals that the regime is still an acceptable interlocutor, should it wish to talk about curbing its nuclear ambitions.
Now that Mr Ahmadi-Nejad has been inaugurated, more serious international business lies ahead. Next month world powers will start discussing whether new sanctions should be imposed if Tehran fails to enter into meaningful negotiations over its nuclear programme.
The US has said it wants the Islamic Republic to show willingness to negotiate over its nuclear programme by September – which means an Iranian response to the set of proposals that world powers have put forward, offering economic and political incentives in return for a halt to uranium enrichment.
When Barack Obama arrived at the White House, a bigger prize was added to the offer: the prospect of a normalisation of relations with the US. Also encouraging were the hints that have emerged from Washington that the US could live with limited uranium enrichment in Tehran if trust between Iran and the west could be established. But the election drama has further complicated the chances of normalisation. The ability of Mr Obama to sell – domestically and to a certain extent also internationally – a more flexible attitude towards uranium enrichment has also been undermined.
The question that will be raised is how Washington could hope to build trust with a regime beset by internal infighting and obsessed with conspiracies, whose intentions are increasingly difficult to read. Can the Iranian leadership, in its present, turbulent state, enter into negotiations or agree on a policy, even if it wanted to?
In the US Congress, meanwhile, patience with Iran is running out and pressure for new unilateral sanctions is mounting. In the Middle East, concern is building over Israel’s own intentions – and how long it will tolerate Iran’s nuclear progress before launching military strikes.
Some Iran watchers argue that the crisis could result in greater co-operation with the west out of a need to restore the government’s legitimacy. They point to the appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi, who has a reputation as a pragmatist, as head of Iran’s nuclear agency, as well as sudden signs of improved access for United Nations nuclear inspectors. Tehran recently allowed inspectors into a reactor that had been off limits for a year, and an upgrade of UN monitoring at the Natanz nuclear plant.
Yet the significance of these moves should not be exaggerated. Mr Salehi is not the point man on negotiations; his job is technical. The more open access for inspectors comes just ahead of a report on Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and could represent no more than an attempt to limit criticism.
What we may be witnessing, however, is a fresh Iranian effort to buy time on the nuclear front while its leaders try to put their house in order. For years Iran has cleverly played the nuclear game, failing to heed international demands but providing just enough hints of co-operation to persuade Russia and China to block crippling measures at the UN Security Council.
The election disaster has made the western ability to respond to Tehran’s moves trickier. Inaction is dangerous because it could encourage Israel to launch a military adventure. Rushing to impose new sanctions, particularly on petrol imports, is also risky.
Iranians, who will bear the brunt of the punishment, might turn more fiercely against the government. But more pressure could also backfire, giving Tehran an excuse to blame foreigners for domestic problems and fulfilling Mr Khamenei’s wish of a return to business as usual.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009.
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