IRAN`S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WON`T DEFEND THE REGIME TO THE LAST MAN / THE ECONOMIST

Guarding whom?

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards won’t defend the regime to the last man

Mohsen Sazegara, one of the force’s founders, believes its various units are more divided than they appear

A portrait of Mohsen Sazegara / Illustration: Dan Williams

WITH THE Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leading Iran’s military efforts in the Middle East war, Iran’s most powerful armed forces find themselves at the centre of attention—and the subject of many questions. 

Where did the IRGC come from? 

What is its current condition? 

Might it attempt a coup, or even turn its back on the very idea of an Islamic Republic? 

And, as the war stretches on, is it really the fearsome enemy it seems?

The IRGC was formed immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979; I was one of its founders, having previously been a leader of the student movement against the Shah. 

The Guards were originally intended to be a people’s army with no more than 5,000 professional personnel, and perhaps ten times as many semi-professional members, serving alongside the regular army in defending the country during times of war. 

Models such as America’s National Guard or the citizen-based defence forces in countries like Switzerland and Israel were considered as inspirations.

However, over time this organisation became distorted. 

It gradually drifted away from its original mission, in three stages. 

First, after the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, it moved into construction and other economic activities. 

Second, during the reform movement that emerged in the late 1990s, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, brought the IRGC into the political arena to suppress dissent. 

Third, from the mid-2000s, the organisation moved into terrorism and organised crime.

In its military branches the IRGC now employs more than 180,000 people. 

The Basij, a militia controlled by the group, claims at least 2.5m members. 

The Quds Force, also run by the IRGC, has thousands of permanent cadres—a credible estimate from a few years ago put it at 14,000—and functions in practice as a terrorist and organised-crime organisation operating throughout the Middle East and beyond. 

Its activities have been responsible for many international conflicts and are disliked by some other parts of the IRGC within Iran.

For years the IRGC has organised and trained special cells throughout Iran. 

Even if the governmental structure were to be severely damaged or cease to function, these cells, numbering in the thousands—one source says as many as 30,000—could operate independently, engaging in fighting, sabotage and the creation of instability. 

The IRGC has also built redundancy into its upper tiers: after recent assassinations of senior figures it designated up to three successors for each IRGC commander in case they too were killed.

It would be wrong to think of the IRGC as functioning like a conventional army with a coherent chain of command. 

Although it can influence decisions of the supreme leader through reports from units such as the IRGC Political Bureau, the primary command centre ultimately remains within the leader’s office. 

The structure that this sits at the heart of is complex, and the IRGC is only a part of it. 

As such, it is hard to imagine the organisation staging a coup.

The Guards are also hamstrung by greed and mismanagement. 

Corruption has spread through the structures of the Islamic Republic like a cancer, affecting large parts of the IRGC. 

Loyalty in the organisation’s lower ranks has been eroded by the corruption among the generals at the top and their networks. 

Setting the Guards directly against the people has only increased dissatisfaction within their ranks. 

Some of the Quds Force’s overseas forays have been unpopular internally, too.

The prevailing sentiment among a large portion of the IRGC’s rank and file, and even within the Ministry of Intelligence, is that their duty is not to defend a particular individual or even the system of velayat-e faqih, from which the supreme leader derives his legitimacy, but rather to protect the territory of Iran and the security of its people. 

By appealing to this sentiment, it may be possible to redirect the loyalty of the IRGC towards a National Reconciliation Council. 

This would have to include representatives from all four of the main political currents: republicans, monarchists, ethnic groups and supporters of the current government and velayat-e faqih; otherwise civil war surely awaits.

The council could appoint a transitional government to administer the country. 

This government could then prepare a referendum on whether to continue with or dismantle the Islamic Republic system, conducted under the supervision of international organisations.

The supreme leader has the power under the constitution to create such a council in place of the parliament. 

Could he be persuaded to take this dramatic step? 

It is possible if, say, America pushed hard for making the formation of a National Reconciliation Council—and the subsequent steps—a condition for ending the war. 

Were that to happen, the supreme leader would face pressure to acquiesce not only from the people but also from large parts of the governing structure and military forces, including the IRGC.

Some will argue that the Revolutionary Guards are too bound into the current system to accept such a radical change. 

The conflicts of the past year appear to have strengthened their unity behind the dictator and the current system. 

But those bonds may be weaker than they look. 

Six months ago an internal assessment conducted by the Ministry of Intelligence reportedly indicated that about half of the rank-and-file members of the IRGC viewed their membership in the organisation simply as a job; if they were to find better employment, they would leave for it. 

Of the other half, who had ideological or political attachments, a large majority were dissatisfied because of the corruption of the commanders, the misguided policies of the leadership and the fact that they had been set against the people.

Relying on internal fractures within the IRGC and expecting mass defections, stoked by America, Israel or Iran’s monarchists, may be too much to hope for. 

However, forming a reconciliation council whose membership includes current political prisoners, leaders of the reform movement and respected IRGC commanders is a feasible path towards a stable, neighbourly post-war Iran.

Mohsen Sazegara is a pro-democracy activist and politician who lives in America. He co-founded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.