AS SYRIA GOES, SO GOES THE MIDDLE EAST / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

As Syria Goes, So Goes the Middle East

Many major powers want the new government to take root. 

By: Kamran Bokhari

Situated at the crossroads of more powerful countries, Syria is the fulcrum of a tumultuous region. 

What happens to the country has important implications for the national security interests of Turkey and Israel. 

Turkey needs the new Syrian government to consolidate itself, while Israel sees the government as a threat, led as it is by the country’s largest Islamist group. 

As for the U.S., it will be difficult to manage two allies with such markedly different perspectives on Syria.

On July 23, the Turkish Defense Ministry acceded to Syrian requests to provide military support after Israeli airstrikes targeted Syrian government and Islamist militias that had attacked Druze minority communities in the southern province of Sweida. 

This came a day after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan – in an oblique reference to Israel – warned that his country would directly intervene against any attempt to fragment Syria and thwart any attempt by groups seeking autonomy there. 

Elsewhere, U.S. President Donald Trump's envoy to Syria (who is also the American ambassador to Turkey), Tom Barrack, was quoted in an AP report from July 21 as saying, “Strong nation-states are a threat – especially Arab states are viewed as a threat to Israel.” 

Earlier, a July 20 report from Axios quoted several unnamed White House officials who expressed serious frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to engage in military action in Syria.

Israel’s success in rolling back Iran’s influence in the Levant has had an unintended consequence. 

The strategic vacuum in Syria has been filled by the Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – the backbone of the interim government headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. 

Put simply, weakening Iran and its radical Shiite proxies empowers Sunni jihadism and vice versa. 

There is no immediate escape for Israel from this cycle.

 

This is why the Israel Defense Forces established a 91-square-mile (236-square-kilometer) buffer zone beyond the Golan Heights in the southern Syrian province of Quneitra. 

The stated purpose of this zone, which stretches from Mount Hermon on the Lebanon-Syria border to the Yarmouk River Valley along Jordan’s border with Syria and Israel, is to protect northern Israel from Islamist factions allied with the al-Sharaa government. 

The new HTS regime has said it does not seek conflict with Israel, and the two countries have been engaged in talks mediated by the United States and the United Arab Emirates, with some discussion facilitated by Azerbaijan. 

But for Israel, the new government’s intentions and capabilities are still unclear.

Through its own indigenous Druze communities, Israel has close ties to certain factions among the Syrian Druze, who oppose the new government’s efforts to establish its influence in Sweida. 

Israel thus intervened when clashes broke out between the Islamist militias and Arab tribes allied with the al-Sharaa government and the separatist Druze factions. 

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Islamist and Bedouin tribal fighters, Syrian forces en route to Sweida, and the government’s military headquarters in Damascus. 

This created friction between Israel and Turkey, the principal backer of the Syrian government.

Despite the souring of ties that began after the 2008-09 Gaza War and the broader Palestinian issue, for years there was no risk of a conflict between Turkey and Israel. 

Iran’s influence in the Levant confined Turkey to a limited military presence in northern Syria, where Ankara was focused on containing Kurdish separatism on both sides of the border. 

Israel’s priority was countering the threat from Iran and its allies. Until last fall. 

Israel's decimation of Hezbollah’s leadership and dismantling of its offensive capabilities created a historic opportunity for Turkey and its Syrian allies to oust the Assad regime.

Turkey wants the new Syrian regime to consolidate power – a process that, barring major disruptions, will take many years. 

Ankara needs a friendly government in Damascus whose power extends to all parts of the country, especially the northeast, where Syrian Kurds led by the Syrian Democratic Forces have ruled themselves since 2012. 

The SDF has been the primary force fighting the Islamic State group and thus gained even more power, which has amplified Ankara’s threat perception. 

Therefore, it would like the SDF and the broader Syrian Kurdish movement that it represents to be integrated into the new Syrian state.

The clashes with the Druze (and before that with the Alawites in northwestern Syria) undermine this goal. 

From Turkey’s point of view, Israel’s support for the Druze sets a bad precedent for others to follow. 

The Druze constitute about 3 percent of the Syrian population, and only certain factions of the community are aligned with Israel. 

Ankara is more concerned about future Israeli support for the Kurds, which make up as much as 10 percent of the country’s population and are militarily a more formidable challenge to Damascus.

So even though Turkey and Israel have no interest in a conflict with each other, their respective imperatives diverge. 

Since April, there have been three rounds of deconfliction talks between the two sides in Baku, which is a close ally of both countries. 

But the discussions have yet to address the strategic differences between the Turks and the Israelis. 

What complicates things further for Israel is that Washington – not to mention Arab powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE – also wants the al-Sharaa government to succeed.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia are the two pillars of the Trump administration’s strategy for managing the Arab world. 

The first step in this management is to steer Syria away from conflict and toward economic development. 

This much was clear when Trump met with al-Sharaa in Riyadh in the presence of Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attending virtually. 

For the U.S., adding Israel to this mix will be critical to ensure that Syria does not descend into civil war as Libya and Yemen did. 

That outcome would have dire security repercussions for the entire region.