War jitters in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran is blowing up ships in the Gulf, says America

How will the Trump administration respond?

THE BLACK-AND-WHITE video is grainy, but what it shows is clear, claims America. An Iranian patrol boat pulls up alongside a ship called the Kokuka Courageous. Iranian sailors, thought to be members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, then remove an unexploded limpet mine from the hull of the ship. The Kokuka Courageous and another ship, the Front Altair, had been crippled hours earlier in “unprovoked attacks” by Iran on June 13th, said Mike Pompeo, America’s secretary of state. Iran denied it was to blame. But hardliners on both sides risk escalating the conflict.

This is the second time in just over a month that tankers have been damaged in the Gulf. On May 12th four ships anchored off Fujairah, a port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), had holes blown in their hulls. A preliminary investigation suggests that they were damaged by limpet mines. America blamed Iran, which issued a denial. The latest explosions caused far more damage, forcing crews to abandon both ships as they were underway. It also sent the price of oil upwards. One-fifth of the world’s supply travels through the Strait of Hormuz, an important chokepoint for international shipping. 
America last month dispatched an aircraft-carrier strike group to the region, citing the threat of Iran; then, in response to the attacks on ships, it also began deploying an extra 1,500 troops to bases in Qatar, Bahrain and Iraq. America’s naval vessels will probably step up their patrols. “Ordinarily the fact that the US wasn’t directly targeted and there were no casualties would give Washington some breathing room to respond,” says Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think-tank. “However, because the free flow of energy is of such vital importance to the world economy, there is a need to show a determination to secure the straits while calming fears of a conflict.” 
For an idea of how things could play out some are looking to the past. The so-called tanker war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s ravaged shipping in the Gulf. Though most attacks were from the air, the Guards honed the use of mine-planting boats—similar to the vessel captured on video on June 13th. Eventually, and with reluctance, America agreed to reflag and escort Kuwaiti vessels through the area. When that did not work, American special forces, operating from special sea barges, were sent to hunt and destroy Iranian mine-layers. That culminated in Operation Praying Mantis: a major air and naval attack on Iranian ships and platforms in 1988.

A repeat of such dramatic moves remains unlikely, for now. Only a half-dozen tankers have been the target of attacks so far, compared with hundreds in the 1980s, and the damage has been limited. With more naval forces in the region, America should be able to keep an eye on suspect ships. Air and naval patrols, to monitor Iranian vessels and hoover up their communications, will have increased. That will make it harder for would-be attackers to approach tankers without being detected. Britain’s Royal Navy also has a frigate and four specialised mine-hunting units patrolling the region, but “we’re not going to be steamrollering into that area with grey ships,” says a well-placed source.

Iran has in the past threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to American sanctions.

Some will see the strikes against ships in the area as a veiled warning of its readiness to make good on its threat. President Donald Trump said on June 14th that if Iran were to block the strait, “it’s not going to be closed for long.” (A study published in 2008 showed that if Iran were to mine the strait, it could take America “the better part of a month" to re-open it.) The Iranian government, for its part, issued a statement on June 13th saying, “The US and its regional allies must stop warmongering and put an end to mischievous plots as well as false flag operations in the region.”

Many hardliners in the Middle East would, indeed, like to see America go to war against Iran.

But the history of revolutionary Iran, including its threats to close the strait, mean that its government—or one of its factions—is the prime suspect. President Hassan Rouhani probably understands that attacking regional shipping would be to invite a Western military response. A day before the attacks he met Shinzo Abe, the prime minister of Japan, who tried to reduce tensions between America and Iran. But Mr Rouhani staked his legacy on a deal, signed in 2015, that loosened sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear programme. That seemed a good bet—until Mr Trump took office in America. Mr Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal vindicated Iran’s hardliners, who have long argued that America is untrustworthy. Mr Rouhani’s popularity has plunged, and with it his control (always tenuous) over the Revolutionary Guards and other hawkish factions.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is decidedly in the latter camp. Though he gave Mr Rouhani space to negotiate the nuclear deal, his dismissive reaction to Mr Abe suggests that his patience has run out. (As it turned out, one of the ships hit in the latest attacks is operated by a Japanese company, Kokuka Sangyo.) Ideology aside, the Guards benefit from what they call the “resistance economy”. Two years ago Mr Rouhani was trying to reduce the group’s role in business. Now, with private firms sidelined, the Guards can step in as the contractor of last resort. Sanctions forced Total, the French energy giant, to pull out of a major offshore gas project; the Guards hope to take its place. The nuclear deal was a threat to the Guards’ interests, and the group has no desire to see it restored.

Both America and Iran seem to be calibrating their response to each other’s actions. With his economy sinking under the weight of American sanctions, Mr Rouhani has warned that Iran will abrogate parts of the nuclear accord unless other signatories—Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union—help his country bypass the sanctions. The Guards may have drawn the conclusion that sporadic mine attacks are a deniable, low-cost and risk-free way to apply pressure on American allies, without incurring a military response.

“We want to get them back at the table, if they want to go back,” says Mr Trump, referring to his efforts to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran. But there are hardliners in America, too. Mr Trump’s hawkish national-security adviser, John Bolton, has long supported regime change in Iran, and even military action against it. In response to the attacks in May, American commanders in the Middle East are reported to have called for an increase of nearly 20,000 troops in the region. Moreover, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have, in recent years, demonstrated a willingness and ability to take military action largely independent of America, in places such as Yemen and Libya. All sides insist they do not want war. But that may not be true of all players. And even if it were, the risk of miscalculation is growing.

Democrats take aim at big agribusiness

Tech companies are not the only ones under fire as competition concerns rise

Rana Foroohar

The two major beneficiaries of the global status quo since the 1980s have been big companies, and big countries. US president Donald Trump is (and will continue to be) spending much of his airtime ahead of the 2020 election going after the biggest of them all: China.

However, Democrats are focusing their economic policy attention at home on the issue of corporate monopolies. And in the last couple of weeks, they have come up with a new focus for their complaints about antitrust issues that could help them gain ground in Republican and swing states — agribusiness.

At a recent “heartland forum” in Iowa, five Democratic presidential hopefuls laid out policies to break up “Big Ag” and help small, family farmers. Elizabeth Warren said she would challenge mergers of big agricultural companies, such as German chemicals group Bayer’s 2016 purchase of US seeds group Monsanto. Meanwhile, Amy Klobuchar, the ranking member of the Senate antitrust subcommittee, complained that two seed companies dominate that market, and four railroads — the same number as “on the Monopoly board”— do most food shipping.

Other contenders, including Cory Booker and Bernie Sanders, have introduced measures to level the playing field in farming. Even the centrist think-tank, Center for American Progress, has come out with a report on concentration in agribusiness, pointing out that four transnational companies control the bulk of America’s food supply. That turns Midwestern pig farmers into unlikely mascots for the diminishing power of labour relative to capital, and links their fortunes to those of groups being targeted by the Democrats, such as gig economy workers. Their message is that while Mr Trump may claim China is the problem, America has bigger issues at home.

The markets for corn seed and meat processing are not quite as concentrated as those for mobile phones or search engines, according to data compiled by the Open Markets Institute. But farms are far more emotionally resonant than technology. The beleaguered American farmer has been a powerful political icon for decades — think of Dorothea Lange’s photographs of Dust Bowl migrants, or the 1985 Farm Aid concert featuring artists including Neil Young, Willie Nelson, and my fellow Hoosier John Mellencamp, whose hit song “Rain on the Scarecrow” was inspired by the worst rural economic conditions since the Depression: “The crops we grew last summer weren’t enough to pay the loans; couldn’t buy the seed to plant this spring, and the Farmer’s Bank foreclosed”.

Current conditions are not that bad, but they are not good. In April, a sentiment index based on a survey of 400 agricultural producers across the US, recorded the fourth largest one-month drop since data collection began in October 2015. Worries about trade had increased, the Purdue University/CME Group Ag Economy Barometer, found. Only 28 per cent of respondents felt that the growing dispute between the US and China over soyabeans (and other trade issues) would be resolved by July, down from 45 per cent the previous month. Nearly half wanted the US to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free trade pact that Mr Trump pulled out of shortly after his election.

This presents an opportunity for Democrats to pick up votes in crucial Midwestern swing states. Farming represents only 1.3 per cent of US employment. But nearly one in five rural counties depend on agriculture as a primary income source. In Iowa, the site of the caucuses that are an early test of US presidential candidates, 30 per cent of the economy is linked to agriculture.

What is more, concentration of power in agribusiness has been a bigger and certainly a longer-term problem for American farmers than China. As a few companies gained control of key areas of the food supply chain, spending on research and development fell, input costs rose, and margins for individual farms went down. The CAP report also documents small farmers being forced into opaque contracts and held up by ridiculous rules, such as those forbidding them to repair their machinery without permission from John Deere or other large manufacturers. (That is something Ms Warren wants to overturn.) Those who try to organise unions have faced retaliation.

It all fits into the larger Democratic effort to reset the economic discussion. They are promising to shift from a trickle down, market-knows-best, technocratic approach that limits the use of public policy solutions to one that acknowledges that where outsized power exists, it needs to be curbed with appropriate regulation.

Do not underestimate heartland support for Mr Trump. His approval ratings in Iowa are at the same level as before the trade war. And I have spoken to any number of people willing to take economic pain in order to reset what they see as a false “free” trade paradigm, in which China gets more than it gives.

But I think Democrats are wise to plant their policy seeds in Iowa. The president has done very little to help the Midwest in real terms over the past two years. Quite the opposite: Deutsche Bank calculates that eight of the 10 states most affected by Mr Trump’s tariffs voted for him in the last election.

Tension in the Strait of Hormuz

Who is blowing up ships in the Gulf?

A mysterious and violent game may yet lead to war

SHINZO ABE hoped this was a moment for diplomacy. His visit to Tehran this week, the first by a Japanese prime minister since the Islamic revolution in 1979, was meant to reduce tensions between America and Iran. After a meeting with Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, Mr Abe warned that the region could “accidentally” slip into conflict. And then, a few miles off Iran’s southern coast, came an illustration of how that might happen.

On June 13th two tankers in the Gulf of Oman sent distress calls after they had been damaged by large explosions. The Front Altair, flagged in the Marshall Islands and owned by Frontline, a Norwegian shipping company, was hauling a cargo of naphtha, an oil derivative, from Abu Dhabi; the Kokuka Courageous, registered in Panama and operated by the Japanese company Kokuka Sangyo, was laden with methanol. Both were bound for Asian ports. Photos from Iranian news agencies showed a fire burning on the starboard side of the Front Altair. The plume of black smoke overhead was thick enough to appear in satellite images. One-fifth of the world’s supply travels through the Strait of Hormuz, an important chokepoint for international shipping.

This is the second time in just over a month that tankers have been damaged in the Gulf. On May 12th four ships anchored off Fujairah, a port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), had holes blown in their hulls. A preliminary investigation suggests that they were damaged by limpet mines. The latest explosions caused far more damage, forcing crews to evacuate both ships as they were underway. It will take weeks to probe what happened, amid reports of torpedoes being used. But the explosions do not seem accidental. The president of Kokuka Sangyo said the Kokuka Courageous vessel was “attacked” twice in a three-hour period.

Nor is it likely that two sets of explosions, weeks apart and in the same area, were mere coincidence. Though a UAE-led investigative team did not assign blame for last month’s sabotage, it said an unnamed “state actor” carried it out. America has blamed Iran for both sets of attacks. Iran, which is a regional rival of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both American allies, has denied responsibility and hints that the latest explosions were orchestrated by its rivals. “Suspicious doesn’t begin to describe what likely transpired,” tweeted Iran’s foreign minister, Muhammad Javad Zarif, on June 13th.

Iran has in the past threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if it were ever attacked. Some will see the strikes against ships in the area as a veiled warning of its readiness to make good on its threat. Messrs Zarif and Rouhani probably understand that attacking regional shipping would be to play with fire. But they do not call all of the shots in Iran. They are stuck in an internal battle with Iran’s ruling mullahs, who are more distrustful of the West, and their Revolutionary Guards, who back local forces in Syria and Yemen that have fought against Emirati- and Saudi-backed forces. Iran has a history of irregular warfare that allows it to maintain a measure of plausible deniability. In the 1980s it fought the so-called tanker war with Iraq. The conflict ravaged international shipping.

Tensions in the region have been rising since last spring, when Donald Trump withdrew from the deal, signed in 2015, that loosened sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear programme. Mr Trump reimposed sanctions and added new ones, in effect cutting Iran off from the global economy. After a year of abiding by the agreement, a bid to win European sympathy, Iran last month said it would begin enriching uranium in excess of the prescribed limits. Mr Rouhani warned that he would abrogate other provisions unless other signatories—Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union—helped his country bypass American sanctions, which is unlikely to happen. Critics of Mr Trump’s approach have long warned that economic distress would lead Iran to lash out.

For the Arab states across the Gulf, these latest explosions fit into a troubling pattern. In May, two days after the Fujairah incident, two blasts in the centre of Saudi Arabia, 700km north of the Yemeni border, damaged an oil pipeline that carries crude across the kingdom. On June 12th a rocket hit the international airport in Abha, a Saudi city 200km from the Yemeni border, injuring 26 people. Both attacks were carried out by the Houthis, a Shia militia that controls large parts of Yemen and is fighting a Saudi-led coalition there. A United Nations panel of experts has said that Iran supplied weapons to the Houthis, including drones and missiles, though the group does not always act at Iran's behest.

But Saudi Arabia and its allies have tried not to escalate directly a conflict that would wreak havoc on their oil exports, and thus their economies. The UAE has been particularly circumspect in its public statements about last month’s sabotage (though in private officials evince little doubt about Iran’s involvement). If there is to be a response, they would like it to come from America. Mr Trump’s hawkish national security adviser, John Bolton, has long supported regime change in Iran, and even military action against it. But the president, as ever, is erratic, toggling between fiery threats and offers of dialogue. He is reported to have given Mr Abe a message to pass to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei (who declined to reply). “We do not believe at all that the US is seeking genuine negotiations with Iran; because genuine negotiations would never come from a person like Trump,” said Ayatollah Khamenei.

Mr Trump has already bolstered America’s military presence in the region. Last month he rushed an aircraft-carrier strike group to the region. Those vessels have not transited the Strait of Hormuz, an effort to avoid further tension. They will probably step up their patrols; an American destroyer picked up some sailors from the stricken tankers (Iran says it rescued some too). The Pentagon is deploying an extra 1,500 troops to bases in Qatar, Bahrain and Iraq, and Mr Trump is invoking emergency powers to override congressional objections and sell weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

All sides insist they do not want war. But even if they are sincere, good intentions go only so far. The Gulf states (and their American protector) cannot tolerate threats to shipping. Mr Abe was right to push for diplomacy between America and Iran. But his visit, and the events that overshadowed it, underscore how difficult that will be.

No, China Can’t Sink the U.S. Treasury Market

Chinese officials are more likely to retaliate against flagship U.S. companies than the government bond market

By Jon Sindreu

China owns U.S. Treasurys worth $1.1 trillion, but threats that it could dump them and upend the bond market ring hollow. Potshots at corporate America have a better chance of getting through to President Trump.

On Monday, Chinese media reported that officials could use the country’s Treasurys as leverage in their response to the Trump administration’s new barrage of tariffs. They have already announced retaliatory taxes on $60 billion worth of U.S. goods.

China can’t give as powerful a blow as the one it is taking—the U.S. is far less dependent on exports—but it can still inflict pain, especially given that President Trump seems to care a lot about how the stock market is doing. The S&P 500 has lost almost 5% since the start of last week, including a 2.4% dip on Monday. Technology and industrial stock have been hardest hit.

The threat to the Treasury market is far less real. In 2015 and 2016, foreign nations dumped U.S. government bonds at the fastest sustained pace in recent history as part of a portfolio strategy to find higher returns elsewhere. Many investors feared the Treasury market would buckle.

But it didn’t, and was never likely to.

Government bond prices mostly depend on investor expectations of where the central bank will set interest rates. That is particularly true of Treasurys, which are the most liquid asset in the world. Even massive selling can only move prices for a short time. In 2016, the flood of bonds on the market seemed to have a small impact for a few months, but it was quickly absorbed.

And that was at a time when the Federal Reserve was intent on tightening policy. This time, tensions with China are leading investors to expect lower rates, encouraging them to buy bonds. Ten-year Treasury yields, which move in the opposite direction to prices, have now fallen to roughly 2.4%.

Another complication for China is that Treasurys are the most convenient asset for reserve managers because of their stability and liquidity. It will be difficult for Chinese officials to find somewhere else to put the proceeds, especially when bringing them back home would buoy the yuan, giving exporters another problem on top of the U.S. tariffs.

This doesn’t mean selling Treasurys is impossible for China. Officials could leave the cash in banks or buy U.S. dollar assets in other countries. Dollars could even be swapped for euros and Japanese yen rather than the home currency.

China can’t give as powerful a blow as the one it is taking—the U.S. is far less dependent on exports—but it can still inflict pain. Photo: greg baker/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

But why would Beijing go to all this trouble for what would likely be—at most—a small scratch in the Treasury market? China’s retaliation is more likely to be directed where it can be effective, such as at flagship U.S. companies. Appleand Boeing ,for example, have customers and plants in China.

For a decade, global investors have failed miserably every time they have fought the Fed. They can at least rest easy in the knowledge that China won’t succeed either.

The Return of Fiscal Policy

Public debt is not a free lunch in an economy close to full employment. But when investment demand tends to fall short of saving, as it does when monetary policymakers are unable to push inflation higher to reduce real interest rates, there is a risk of chronic underemployment – and a stronger argument for deficit spending.

Barry Eichengreen


FRANKFURT – Five years ago, the French economist Thomas Piketty made a splash with his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, in which he argued that there is an innate tendency toward wealth concentration in market economies. The mechanism to which Piketty pointed was that the rate of interest, r, is higher than the rate of economic growth, g. With r>g, owners of the means of production – the capitalist class – earn a return that exceeds the growth of the economy as a whole.

By highlighting the problem of wealth inequality and providing a pithy explanation of it, Piketty struck a chord. Not many economics books sell more than a million copies.

Earlier this year, another French economist, Olivier Blanchard, the outgoing president of the American Economic Association and a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, gave an acclaimed address in which he argued that the debt-carrying capacity of the advanced economies is greater than commonly supposed. The basis for his conclusion was that the rate of interest was less than the rate of economic growth. With r< g, the debt-to-GDP ratio, which measures a society’s capacity to service debts, will have a denominator that is growing faster than the numerator, so long as the budget is close to balance. Meanwhile, John Williams, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has published a series of widely cited studies showing that the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of interest has been trending downward for fully two decades. So have we now moved from Piketty’s r>g world to Blanchard’s r< g world? If so, can their views be reconciled?

The answer is no and yes. The views of Piketty and Blanchard can indeed be reconciled, because they are talking about different interest rates. While Blanchard focuses on the rate on low-risk government bonds, Piketty is concerned with the return on risky capital investments. Because the two interest rates are separated by a risk premium of roughly five percentage points, it is entirely possible for the rate on government bonds to be below the economic growth rate, while the rate on capital is above it.
Why the risk premium is so large is a bit of a mystery. One must assume that consumers are incredibly risk-averse in order to generate a premium of the observed magnitude. Still, the existence of this risk premium explains how Piketty and Blanchard can both reach their respective conclusions.

What are the implications for policy? Williams’s analysis, by highlighting that interest rates are unusually low for this stage of the business cycle, cautions that there may be little room to cut them in a downturn. This prospect has led the Fed to launch a comprehensive review of its monetary-policy strategy.

For Piketty, the rising wealth concentration that results from a large risk premium calls for higher taxes on the wealthy on equity and social-cohesion grounds. For Blanchard, the implication is that governments can safely accumulate more debt. In countries with pressing infrastructure needs, like the United States, there is room for additional public investment. Similarly, government-funded forgiveness of student loan debt, as advocated by Senator Elizabeth Warren, may make sense, because members of the current generation would receive significant relief while future generations would pay only a small share of their higher incomes to service additional public obligations.

That said, public debt is not a free lunch in an economy close to full employment. By spending more, the government will be tapping additional scarce resources. Other spending, including investment, will be crowded out, implying weaker economic growth.

But what about an economy that is not at full employment? This is the case considered by another prominent economist, former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who takes Williams’s analysis a step further. Summers argues that the rate of interest delivered by market forces, left to their own devices, is now significantly below zero. Because twenty-first-century firms like Google and Facebook require only modest amounts of tangible capital, and because the relative price of capital goods has been falling, the “natural” rate of interest that equates saving with investment is now actually negative, absent policy support.

But nominal interest rates can’t be forced much below zero. And monetary policymakers, for their part, seem unable to push inflation above 1-2% in order to drive down real interest rates. Investment demand therefore tends to fall short of saving, creating a risk of chronic underemployment.

In this case, the argument for additional deficit spending to supplement deficient private spending is stronger, because there is less risk of crowding out productive private investment. This does not mean that the scope for running deficits is unlimited, because at some point safe government debt could be re-rated as risky, causing interest rates to rise. That said, these arguments lead to a straightforward conclusion: in the future, we will have to rely more on fiscal policy and less on monetary policy to achieve stable and equitable growth.

Barry Eichengreen is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former senior policy adviser at the International Monetary Fund. His latest book is The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era.

Escaping the Rat Race: Why We Are Always Running Out of Time

Author Daniel Hamermesh talks about his new book, Spending Time: The Most Valuable Resource

William Penn, a colonist who helped found the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, once said, “Time is what we want most, but what we use worst.” That’s the dilemma for many people trying to balance the competing demands of work, family, finances, technology and self-care. The rat race is the biggest reason why Americans are so pressed for time, according to a new book by scholar Daniel Hamermesh. That culture likely won’t change without a government mandate, but he doesn’t see that on the horizon for the U.S. Hamermesh, a distinguished scholar at Barnard College and professor emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin, joined the Knowledge@Wharton radio show on Sirius XM to talk about his book, Spending Time: The Most Valuable Resource, and why Americans can’t get off the treadmill. (Listen to the podcast at the top of this page.)

An edited transcript of the conversation follows.

Knowledge@Wharton: Are we spending our time wisely?

Daniel Hamermesh: I don’t think people think enough about how they spend time. They go through motions. They feel more and more rushed. Ideally, I’d like people to sit back and think about what they’re doing. Maybe it would make them feel happier and a little bit less stressed for time.

Knowledge@Wharton: What drew you to write this book?

Hamermesh: I’ve been thinking about time since I was four years old. My mom got me a watch — analog, of course — in 1947. I’ve been fascinated by time ever since. I worry about it a lot. Pure neurosis.

Knowledge@Wharton: With all the data that is out there, is it easier now to understand why we do certain things surrounding our time and our lives, compared with 30 or 40 years ago?

Hamermesh: I think it’s more understandable for two reasons. First of all, it’s only in the last 20 years that the U.S. has had very good data about how people spend their time. The government started collecting 1,000 diaries. You sit down tomorrow morning, fill out what you’re doing every minute of today. They have been getting 1,000 of those every month since 2003. So, there’s a lot more data.

The second thing is economists have thought about it much more. Only in 1965 did they really start thinking about it, and only because of these data, which I use in this book at great length, have people begun to analyze what people do with their time and test their ideas on it.
Knowledge@Wharton: You correlate economic factors with the scarcity of time. Can you talk about that?

Hamermesh: Time is an economic factor; economics is about scarcity more than anything else. Because our incomes keep on going up, whereas time doesn’t go up very much, time is the increasingly important scarce factor. That’s especially true for rich people who have a lot of money, but really no more time than poor people do.

Knowledge@Wharton: How do you distinguish the use of time between rich and poor?

Hamermesh: It’s amazing in this regard. The rich, of course, work more than the others. They should. There’s a bigger incentive to work more. But even if they don’t work, they use their time differently. A rich person does much less TV watching — over an hour less a day than a poor person. They sleep less. They do more museum-going, more theater. Anything that takes money, the rich will do more of. Things that take a lot of time and little money, the rich do less of. That’s true here in the U.S. That’s true in France, which I looked at, and true elsewhere.

Knowledge@Wharton: How do we approach the use of time here in the U.S. versus what you see in other countries?

Hamermesh: The only major difference is that Americans are the champions of work among rich countries. We work on average eight hours more per week in a typical week than Germans do, six hours more than the French do. It used to be quite a bit different. Forty years ago, we worked about average for rich countries. Today, even the Japanese work less than we do. The reason is very simple: We take very short vacations, if we take any. Other countries get four, five, six weeks. That’s the major difference.

Knowledge@Wharton: How is the pay in those countries compared with the U.S.? Is it level, or is there a significant difference on the negative? 
Hamermesh: Slightly different on the negative. Germany isn’t quite as well off as we are. France isn’t. Japan isn’t. But take Norway, where they also get four or five weeks of vacation: They’re better off than we are. Yes, if we worked less, we’d have to give up a little bit, but not very much. It’s a choice, like anything else. Sit back and think about it and decide how you want to spend your time and how you’d like society to put impositions on you to spend your time — we need to do that. That’s the whole point of the book.
Knowledge@Wharton: Is there something that we can glean from what the Norwegians do?

Hamermesh: I don’t think we can do it individually. Sure, I can tell you, “Take it easy. Relax. Walk to work instead of racing for an Uber or a taxi.” But if everyone does this on his own, it’s not going to make much of a difference. All these other countries made the decision, politically, to give people more time off. Until the U.S. does that, until we do it by mandate of vacations, I don’t think people are going to feel less rushed. In fact, they’re going to feel more rushed as they get more income with no more time.

Knowledge@Wharton: In the U.S., does how much we work factor into the income inequality gap?

Hamermesh: No question. It exacerbates the gap, very simply, because there’s more incentives for rich people to work more. There is less of an incentive for a low-wage person to work more. And the rich get richer. It’s our own behavior responding to incentives that exacerbates both the income gap and the time gap between rich and poor.

Knowledge@Wharton: How has technology affected our use of time?

Hamermesh: I don’t think it has changed the amount of time we spend on different things. There’s no question technology has made us better off. Think about going to a museum. When I went to the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago as a kid, you’d pull levers. You did a few things. These days, it’s all incredibly immersive. Great technology. But you can’t go to the museum in any less time. You can’t cut back on sleep. A few things are easier to do more quickly because of technology: cooking, cleaning, washing, I don’t know if you’re old enough to remember the semi-automatic washing machine with a ringer. Tremendous improvements in the things you do with the house. Technology has made life better, but it hasn’t saved us much time.

Knowledge@Wharton: I’m a dad of three kids who all play sports, so any of that extra time saved by technology is taken up with their sporting activities.

Hamermesh: Perhaps that’s true. But think of how much more fun you’re having because you can spend time with those sporting activities, whereas beforehand you would have been working in a factory eight hours a day, five days a week. So, we are better off, but it’s not that we’re going to have more time; we’re going to have less time. But we have more money chasing the same number of hours.

Knowledge@Wharton: Tell us about the differences in the way men and women use time?

Hamermesh: It’s really fascinating. In the U.S., how do you define work? We work for pay. We also work at home: shopping, cleaning, cooking, walking the dog, etc. It turns out men and women in the U.S. and other northern European rich countries do about the same amount of total work. There’s very little difference. Women work about one hour more per week than men. They do more house work, less work for pay, yet women are much more bothered by that time stress. In every country I’ve looked at, which was six, women are more bugged by feeling rushed. It’s a fascinating thing.

I think the reason is that women are house managers. Think what happens. A kid gets sick, [the father] is going to come into work. I don’t know what your spouse does, but my spouse would be the one who stayed home when we had little kids, even though she was working also. I think it’s juggling things, doing different things that makes women feel rushed for time.

Knowledge@Wharton: What about our use of time in retirement?

Hamermesh: I’m partly retired. I work only 30 hours a week, which at age 75 is a heck of a lot of work. People sort of go from age 60 to 75 and mostly stop working. What do you do with that time when you have more of it? Depressingly enough, you’d hope people would spend time enriching their lives, reading and so on. The biggest sink for time once you retire are two things: sleep, a little bit; and most important of all, TV watching. Old people watch a heck of a lot more TV than younger people. It’s a sad comment. People get more time, and an awful lot is used to watch the tube.

Knowledge@Wharton: You have a chapter titled “When We Work.” One of the unique things that’s been going on in the last few years is how the gig economy has changed when we work. People now have more options, would you agree?

Hamermesh: A little bit, but that’s very few people. It’s probably a couple of percent at most, as the evidence suggests. What’s most interesting about when we work is you compare America to western European countries, and it’s hard to find a shop open on a Sunday in western Europe. Here, we’re open all the time. Americans work more at night than anybody else. It’s not just that we work more; we also work a lot more at night, a lot more in the evenings, and a heck of a lot more on Sundays and Saturdays than people in other rich countries. We’re working all the time and more.

Knowledge@Wharton: Why do we do that?
Hamermesh: It’s a rat race. If I don’t work on a Sunday and other people do, I’m not going to get ahead. Therefore, I have no incentive to get off that gerbil tube, get out of it and try to behave in a more rational way. Again, it’s a wonderful example of what economists call externalities. I do it. You do it. The only way it’s going to be solved is if somehow some external force, which in the U.S. and other rich countries is the government, imposes a mandate that forces us to behave differently. No individual can do it.

Knowledge@Wharton: How do these issues affect our economy here in the U.S.?

Hamermesh: [Let’s] define economics as using scarce resources to maximize our well-being. So, no question, these things give us more income than we otherwise have. They also make us run around more and make us less happy. For that reason alone, I think something needs to be done about this. We have to force ourselves, as a collective, as a polity, to change our behavior. Pass legislation to do it. Every other rich country did that between 1979 and 2000. We think the Japanese are workaholics. They’re not workaholics. Compared to us, they work less than we do, yet 40 years ago they worked a heck of a lot more. They chose to cut back.

Knowledge@Wharton: Still, the productivity has to be relatively high for Japan’s economy to be so strong?

Hamermesh: Well, it is. But so are we. We’re an incredibly rich country. I wish people who were younger realized how well off they are compared to their parents or grandparents. It’s just very unfortunate. We want more dollars without thinking, are the dollars really going to make us happier?

Knowledge@Wharton: Is it possible to change our policies to acquire some of the benefits that other countries have?

Hamermesh: I think it’s possible. But again, it takes a political will at a time in which it’s anathema to even think about raising taxes on anybody. It’s going to be a heck of a lot of trouble to change the rules so that people are mandated to take four weeks of vacation or to take a few more paid holidays. Other countries have done it. It didn’t just happen from the day the countries were born. They chose to do it. It’s a political issue, like the most important things in life. Economics feeds into it, but it requires political thought and political judgment.

Knowledge@Wharton: Do Americans complain more about time than people in other countries?

Hamermesh: That’s true. I think complaining is the American national pastime, not baseball. But the thing is, those who are complaining about the time as being scarce are the rich. People who are poor complain about not having enough money. I’m sympathetic to that. They’re stuck. The rich — if you want to stop complaining, give up some money. Don’t work so hard. Walk to work. Sleep more. Take it easy. I have no sympathy for people who say they’re too rushed for time. It’s their own darn fault.

Knowledge@Wharton: What’s your expectation as we go forward?

Hamermesh: What’s the biggest economic change in the last two years? It’s the Trump tax cut at the end of 2017. What does that do? That gives more money after taxes to the rich and no more to the lower and middle class. What’s going to happen is the rich are going to feel more rushed for time because they have no more time but more income in their pocket. They will spend more time racing around and will complain more about how scarce time is. So yes, I see in the next few years an exacerbation of this kind of time divide.

Knowledge@Wharton: Does this also widen the divide between the haves and the have-nots in the business world?

Hamermesh: Absolutely. The guys at the top are getting more money in their pocket. They’re going to feel more and more they have to race around. The fellow down on the line is not going to feel it. I think it’s an increasing time divide that will contribute to an increasing social divide. It’s not just income inequality, it’s time inequality, which is very depressing.

Knowledge@Wharton: In one chapter, you talk about togetherness, which is a great topic. Tell us about it.

Hamermesh: It’s really fascinating. What do we mean by being together? If I’m sleeping in the same bed or room as my wife, are we together? Sort of. But we aren’t really interacting. You look at how much time people spend together really doing the same thing, really interacting, it’s a couple of hours a day. Most of our time we’re running around doing different things with lots of different people, but only [spending] a few hours with the same person each day.

The Real Victims of China’s Trade Patterns

Many in the West, especially US President Donald Trump, have railed against China’s massive trade surpluses, which emerged after the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. But China’s developing-country neighbors have far more reason to be worried.

Jayati Ghosh

ghosh9_Frédéric Soltan Corbis via Getty Images_bangladeshfactoryworkers

NEW DELHI – Much has been written about the consequences of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially for the developing countries of Asia. Yet another, equally consequential phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed: China’s upending of trade relationships with those countries.

Many in the West, especially US President Donald Trump, have railed against China’s massive trade surpluses, which emerged after the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. But China’s developing-country neighbors have far more reason to be worried.

Since peaking in 2015 – when the surplus in merchandise trade reached nearly $680 billion – China’s trade imbalance has been shrinking. But its surpluses remain very large in absolute terms, and in developing Asia, they continue to grow.

This was not always the case. For years, trade between China and Asia’s developing economies was mostly balanced. China was a source of voracious demand for raw materials, energy, and other intermediate inputs needed to fuel its massive processing-export sector. Those inputs came largely from developing economies, especially in Asia.

Chinese demand was highly beneficial for many of these countries. It drew them into (China-centered) manufacturing value chains and produced the combination of larger export volumes and better terms of trade desired by primary-commodity exporters. Exports to China thus became a powerful engine of these countries’ economic growth.

After 2011, however, China’s imports from Asia’s developing economies stagnated, while its exports to them continued to swell, partly offsetting declining demand for Chinese goods in the advanced economies. In the decade after the global financial crisis, Asia’s share of China’s total exports doubled, standing at about 15% last year. In 2012, China’s merchandise trade surpluses with Asia began swelling as well, reaching some $130 billion in 2015 and $111 billion in 2018.

Within the last decade, China’s trade balance with the Philippines has swung from persistent deficits to a substantial surplus, and its longtime surpluses with Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and India have continued to grow. India’s trade deficit with China has experienced the biggest increase, rising nearly threefold from 2010 to 2018. Among Asia’s major developing economies, China has had persistent deficits only with Malaysia (from which it generally imports high-tech goods) and Thailand; but even these declined after 2011.

So while China reaps growing benefits from its neighbors, most of the rest of Asia faces a negative net stimulus from the country, as trade deficits drain effective demand. This trend is likely to deepen.

Chinese imports from developing Asia have risen since 2016, including last year, but not by much. And a sudden surge is unlikely, because China has been developing domestic sources for a range of intermediate inputs – an effort that has steadily reduced its integration into global value chains over the last decade.

In China – unlike in most other economies covered by the OECD’s trade in value-added (TiVA) database – the foreign content of exports declined by nearly ten percentage points from 2005 (26.3%) to 2016 (16.6%). Meanwhile, China’s contributions to the value-added in partner countries’ exports increased, especially for developing Asian economies, several of which showed significantly higher shares of Chinese value-added in their own exports of manufactures, even those that went to China.

To some extent, China’s de-integration from global value chains also goes the other way: the country is working to decrease its overall reliance on external demand, by shifting from a manufacturing-focused, export-led growth model to one driven by services and underpinned by domestic consumption. According to TiVA data, foreign demand accounted for less than 17% of domestic production in 2015, down from nearly 24% a decade earlier.

But this trend creates risks for China’s trading partners. It will not stem the growth of China’s overall trade surpluses with much of developing Asia, because China’s exports to Asia will increasingly extend beyond manufactured consumer goods to include the high-tech products that are at the forefront of the country’s current growth strategy. This will contribute not just to trade imbalances, but also to growing technological and value-added imbalances.

The pattern can already be seen in trade with India, which exports mainly raw materials (like iron ore) and processed agricultural goods to China, but imports from it manufactured goods (including a growing volume of high-tech items). This implies increasing returns on activities in China. For India, however, less technology-intensive exports do not generate dynamic returns to scale.

Taken together, recent trade trends are the cause of both macroeconomic and sectoral concerns for China’s trading partners in developing Asia. But these countries’ options for resisting these trends are limited. After all, China has achieved much faster diversification and productivity growth, especially over the last decade, giving it a substantial competitive advantage over its trading partners.

Will China ensure that BRI projects and other financial flows mitigate the damage these trade trends imply for developing Asia’s growth? Or will the BRI make matters worse for China’s neighbors? As Chinese economic and political influence in Asia continues to grow, questions such as these will become increasingly urgent.

Jayati Ghosh is Professor of Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, Executive Secretary of International Development Economics Associates, and a member of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation.

America’s Unusual Recovery is Now Also its Longest

After overcoming significant political and economic headwinds during the past decade, the US economy now appears to have undergone its longest sustained expansion in history. Yet, behind the data showing historically low unemployment and long-awaited wage growth lie vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored.

Mohamed A. El-Erian


LONDON – Data released over the next few months will show that the current US economic expansion is the longest on record. But while the United States continues to outperform other advanced economies, this success has yet to dispel many Americans’ persistent sense of economic insecurity and frustration; nor does it alleviate concerns about the lack of policy space to respond to the next economic downturn or financial shock.

The current expansion began in mid-2009, following the 2008 financial crisis and the “Great Recession.” Powered initially by exceptional fiscal interventions and previously unthinkable monetary policies, the economy built enough of a foundation for private-sector confidence to return, and for corporate balance sheets to recover. Coupled with accelerating advances in new technologies, the expansion came to be led in large part by technology and platform companies presiding over the new “gig economy.” It was given further impetus by pro-growth measures, including deregulation and tax cuts.

With the US unemployment rate at 3.6%, real (inflation-adjusted) wages are now growing at 1.6%. And with the most recent quarterly data indicating an annualized GDP growth rate of 3.1%, US economic activity continues to outpace that of Europe and Japan by a significant margin. Owing to this strength, America has become increasingly assertive in pursuing national objectives abroad, including by circumventing longstanding cooperative and conflict-resolution mechanisms and threatening import tariffs and other protectionist measures.

To get to this point, the US had to overcome headwinds from abroad, including an existential debt crisis in Europe and slowing economic growth in China. Domestically, deep political polarization, especially since 2011, has impeded congressional legislative activity and produced multiple actual or threatened government shutdowns (including the longest on record). In the absence of new pro-growth measures from Congress, monetary policy became the “only game in town.” After being forced to expand its role in the economy substantially during the crisis years, the US Federal Reserve flirted with some major policy mistakes, and became more vulnerable to political interference.

Because annual growth over the past decade has often been tepid and insufficiently inclusive – what has become known as the “new normal,” or secular stagnation – the US economy has been left with a residual sense of underperformance and potential vulnerability. According to an oft-cited Fed survey, almost half of US households report having insufficient savings to cover a $400 emergency expense.

No wonder trust in institutions and expert opinion remains so low. Coupled with excessive inequality (of income, wealth, and opportunity), frustration and political anger remain high. Making matters worse, fearmongering about the implications of technology and globalization continues to fuel concerns of job dislocations and disruptions. And outside the US, many have come to worry that the superpower responsible for issuing the global reserve currency, and that plays a decisive role in many multilateral interactions, is no longer a reliable and predictable anchor for global trade and finance.

Moreover, unlike in prior expansions, the US is yet to build sufficient buffers to deal with future economic and financial challenges. Or, to quote former US President John F. Kennedy by way of IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde more recently, we have not fixed the roof while the sun was shining.

Beyond the lack of self-insurance at the household level, the Fed’s ability to counter economic recessions and financial disruptions is rather limited. Whereas the current policy rate is 2.25%-2.5%, past downturns have usually required cuts of five percentage points or more. Also, the Fed has a bloated balance sheet and a rather weak mechanism for transmitting monetary-policy measures to the real economy. And even if fiscal policymakers were to become more responsive, they would be starting from a point of relatively high deficits and debt.

Prolonging the current expansion will require great care. Policymakers, particularly Congress, need to avoid big mistakes and minimize the risk of market accidents while doing more to promote growth. The US needs a well-targeted approach to modernizing and upgrading its infrastructure.

Policymakers and leading economists also must be more sensitive to how the fruits of economic growth are shared; among other things, there should be better protections for the most vulnerable segments of society and stronger automatic stabilizers. Businesses, for their part, need to do more to embrace their social responsibilities, if only to avoid ending up in the same position as the banks after the 2008 crash. There is already a growing chorus calling for more regulatory constraints on Big Tech.

Moreover, having shaken up global trade, the US needs to ensure that it will remain the anchor of the rules-based international system. Otherwise, its ability to inform and influence economic and financial outcomes around the world will weaken.

The US will – and should – soon be celebrating its longest-ever expansion. But it must not lose sight of its remaining challenges. The last thing the world needs right now is for today’s expansion to give way to a sustained period of lower growth, higher financial instability, and greater cross-border tensions.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, Chief Economic Adviser at Allianz, the corporate parent of PIMCO where he served as CEO and co-Chief Investment Officer, was Chairman of US President Barack Obama’s Global Development Council. He previously served as CEO of the Harvard Management Company and Deputy Director at the International Monetary Fund. He was named one of Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. He is the author, most recently, of The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse.

 A Different Kind Of Wage Inflation Heralds This Cycle’s End

by John Rubino

Towards the end of long expansions (this one is the longest on record) things get tight. Factories operate flat-out and start raising prices. Good workers become harder to find and companies start competing for them with higher wages and other perks.

This story is about the “other perks” which, because they don’t show up in wages aren’t directly inflationary. But they do cost money, which means they shrink corporate profits nearly as much as would a big wage increase. From today’s Wall Street Journal:

Factories Tire of Wage Wars; Give Fridays Off, Spiff Up Bathrooms 
Five years ago, entry-level candidates could expect to earn nine bucks an hour at a Haworth Inc. office-furniture factory. The economy was humming, but job growth was choppy, and wage gains anemic. 
Things changed, though, as average unemployment in the counties where Haworth makes products like movable walls, desk chairs and storage cabinets tumbled from 6.3% in 2014 to 3.6% last year. Today’s newcomer makes $12.50 an hour. 
Pay increases have become table stakes for those doing battle in this tight labor market. Consulting firm Mercer LLC found in a February study that the No. 1 human-resources risk executives face is excessive time required to fill open positions. The median cost to recruit an employee is $1,300, according to recent data. 
If you’re a hiring manager and not prepared to pull out your pocketbook, prepare to suffer. And even if you are, prepare to suffer. 
“This wage war isn’t winnable,” Ann Harten, Haworth’s human-resources chief, told me at the company’s Holland, Mich., headquarters. It’s simple arithmetic: Haworth’s revenue grows at about a 5% annual clip, trailing the approximately 8% in entry-level increases it has been dishing out. 
The wage wars aren’t going away. As we chatted, a construction company offered jobs paying $13.50 an hour, a $500 signing bonus, benefits and a car to drive materials around the Grand Rapids area. A farm in nearby Zeeland offered $14 an hour to load turkeys into cages during the overnight shift. 
Nonetheless, Haworth thinks it can respond without going broke, and a growing number of companies agree. By shaking up shift scheduling, investing in amenities for workers or offering more flex time, companies believe that treating blue-collar workers more like white-collar counterparts may convince them to sign on or stick around. 
Haworth will put this theory to the test on May 19. That’s when about 300 employees at a plant that makes laminated tops of desks and conference tables in Holland start working a new schedule that allows a three-day weekend every other week, a golden benefit for people living near Lake Michigan during the summer. 

“We’ve been desperately seeking the ideal of sustainable workloads,” Ellen Kossek, a professor at Purdue University’s Krannert School of Management, said. But “people always said in manufacturing you can’t do work-life balance.” 
Her research indicates a similar logic is applied to sectors like retail, logistics, hospitality or transportation. You can’t assemble John Deere combines in your home office or serve a hamburger to a hungry customer after you pick up the kids. Conventional wisdom tells us the only way to improve your lot at a job that strictly adheres to a time clock is to demand a raise. 
Workers have different ideas. Homebase, a San Francisco company helping local business manage time sheets, hiring and payroll, polled 2,000 hourly employees about important factors in deciding where to work. Pay ranked near the top, but respondents gave about equal weight to a positive work environment and schedules that fit their lifestyle. 
Haworth has been experimenting with friendlier shifts, Ms. Harten said, as a way to attract workers as unemployment sank. The company found it worth its while. 
Big changes aren’t simple or smooth. Haworth’s scheme includes 20 different shift patterns and a variety of pay variations, adding complexity when most firms seek simplicity. For example, one pattern has employees working a 36-hour week—three 12-hour shifts on Sunday, Tuesday and Wednesday. Then, they get the rest of the week off, before working four 12-hour shifts, Monday through Thursday, the next week and receiving eight hours of overtime pay. Rinse, repeat.

The trend towards more reasonable working environments in blue-collar industries is both a good thing and long overdue. But companies aren’t doing this because they want to. The alternative is an empty factory floor.

Flexible schedules and nicer bathrooms are expensive and their spread is an indication of how tight labor markets have become.
In other words, late-cycle dynamics are now in play, as wages and better-but-more-costly working conditions produce lower corporate profits which then collide with record high stock prices and soaring debt (both of which are also signs of late-cycle excess) to bring the expansion to an end. After ten straight years of debt-fueled growth, this shouldn’t surprise anyone.

Clever science alone cannot prevent the next mass extinction

We must accept that having more children is not in our interest as a species

Camilla Cavendish

We cannot win a war against water. So says the chair of the UK Environment Agency, warning that climate change may force homeowners in Britain to retreat from the coasts.

Nor should we persist in our war against nature more broadly. That is the message of the UN’s sober but devastating report into biodiversity, which warns that human overpopulation is harming the very plant and animal species on which we rely for survival.

It’s hard to get one’s head around the UN forecast that up to 1m of the planet’s estimated 8m species now face extinction. The assessment says that our dominant species is now eroding the ecosystems that form the foundations of our economies and our quality of life. The debate is no longer simply about ethics and cuddly polar bears. It has become about self-interest and the need to preserve those ugly but essential creatures, insects and nematodes, which are vital to pollination and soil fertility. Perhaps, as a result, it will gain more traction.

A “background” level of extinction, an ebb and flow of species, is perfectly normal. Some species die out because they are poorly adapted; some vanish without us ever having been aware of their struggle for survival. But mass extinctions are different — they swallow both the fit and the unfit. Five such events have been especially devastating. The most recent was at the end of the Cretaceous period, 65m years ago. It wiped out not just the dinosaurs, but 75 per cent of all species.

Now we face what some scientists believe will be the sixth mass extinction — one brought about by humans. The forecasts are not at Cretaceous levels yet, but they are deeply alarming. Scientists have catalogued only a small fraction of all species. We know far too little about which bricks in the pile might, if removed, topple whole structures.

Clever science cannot turn this tide. Far-sighted organisations have already created gene banks, seed banks and zoological reserves. But, in the long term, species can only survive in the wild. Complex ecosystems are extremely hard to recreate once damaged.

In her book The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, Elizabeth Kolbert has vividly described the vain struggles to save species ahead of the extinction wave. She writes of ecologists visiting Panama and Costa Rica, trying and failing to salvage the golden toad and 19 other amphibians. She has trudged with biologists through the Adirondacks in the US, where once commonplace bats were suddenly dying. She describes ecosystems upended not only by farming, logging and fishing, but also by trade, travel and science. Doctors using the African clawed frog to develop pregnancy tests have unwittingly spread a fatal fungal disease among frog species in Central America.

What is striking about these experiences is how swiftly tipping points can be reached — and how powerless we are to respond. We are out of our depth trying to fathom or control the biosphere’s complex connections.

It is hard to disentangle the threat to species from climate change, for example, because each problem exacerbates the other. Species find it harder to survive as temperatures warm and a loss of peat bogs, rainforests and other carbon sinks accelerate the volume of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. According to the UN report, coral reefs could shrink by at least 70 per cent if the world warms by a further 0.5C — or virtually disappear by 1C.

Our slowness to appreciate the danger seems strange, when scientists have been warning of it for decades, and when human impact is so glaring. The UN says that about three-quarters of the land, two-thirds of our oceans and 85 per cent of wetlands have already been altered or lost. Yet modern life is increasingly disconnected from nature.

We move to cities and entertain ourselves indoors. Fewer people notice depleted hedgerows, or that the swallows no longer nest. We waste food without knowing its provenance. We used to talk about “food miles” — how far products had travelled. Now, we are inured to supermarket shelves of vegetables shipped around the globe in all seasons.

These issues are almost too big to think clearly about. But we are poorly prepared partly because we long ago internalised the fact that the global population increase in the 20th century has been three times the level it had reached during all of previous human history, from 1.5bn in 1900, to 6.1bn in 2000. The population growth rate peaked in the 1960s, but the total is still growing, partly because sub-Saharan Africa is not following other continents in the trend of falling birth rates. There is some disagreement between the UN forecast of global population growing to 11bn in 2100, and that of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, which predicts the global population will peak at 9.4bn in 2070 and then decline. Whichever view you favour, it will clearly be a priority to help African countries adopt education programmes to slow population growth.

Having more children is not in our interest as a species. But many governments worry about the impact of falling fertility on their own nation’s gross domestic product: Germany, Singapore, France and Poland pay baby bonuses to encourage couples to have children — though a rather tasteless Danish campaign, urging couples to “Do It For Denmark”, doesn’t seem to have worked.

It is irresponsible to welcome the UN report with warm words, while promoting increases in population. We started a war with nature to survive. But if we do not call a truce now, the losers will be us.

The writer, a senior fellow at Harvard University, is the author of ‘Extra Time: Ten Lessons For An Ageing World’

Doug Casey on What Happens After the Next War

By: Doug Casey

International Man: The US government is actively at war in about half a dozen countries. It’s eyeing new conflicts all the time.

On the topic of getting involved in another war… President Trump was reported to have said this about his National Security Advisor John Bolton: “If it was up to John, we'd be in four wars now.”

What do you make of all this?

Doug Casey: Where to start?

Well, first of all, things are out of control. The US Government has become so big, so dysfunctional, and with its fingers in so many pies that anything can happen, unpredictably. Secondly, it’s extremely dangerous. Prodding lots of hornet’s nests guarantees you’ll be stung—perhaps enough to put you in the hospital. Third, it’s extraordinarily expensive. And the US Government is already bankrupt.

As you pointed out, the US is actively at war in right now in who knows how many countries— including at least a half a dozen in Africa that nobody can find on a map. There are combat troops in probably 100 countries around the world.

There are probably 800 bases around the world. These things are all just trip wires waiting for an accident or an incident to draw the country into a real war. So far—at least since the misadventure in Vietnam—the US has just engaged in trouble-making exercises and sport wars. But the big thing on the horizon right now is Iran. This is hunting big game.

One of the things that I most regret not having done in recent years was taking advantage of an all-expense paid junket, courtesy of the Iranian Ambassadors’ Polo Club, for the New Zealand Ambassadors’ Polo Club, of which I was member. It would have been wonderful to have seen three of the major Iranian cities and met some of the top people in the country while playing polo. I couldn’t do it though, because I was injured at the time.

The Iranian people have no negative animus towards the American people. The average Iranian likes the average American. He likes American cars, American music, American movies, American culture. He likes California girls. He likes everything about America.

The way to change that and turn the average Iranian into an enemy is to send uniformed American teenagers there to destroy property and kill people. That’s exactly what morons like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo are talking about. It could be a real catastrophe, because Iran is big game. It's not like hunting small game, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria—which themselves were terrible catastrophes.

If this gets out of control—accidentally, or through a false flag incident, or simply because Bolton decides it’s a good idea—you could be looking at the start of World War III.

The “powers that be” think that war stimulates the economy. But the idea is complete nonsense. These fools actually believe turning lots of cities into smoking ruins would stimulate the economy.

International Man: The US government and mainstream media often justify these wars on the need to “spread democracy.” What do you make of that?

Doug Casey: The idea of spreading democracy is a snare and a delusion. Democracy has become the new societal god. In fact—and I know most readers will be appalled to hear this—democracy is a bad idea. At least for anything larger than a city-state with a small, cohesive population.

First of all, democracy is simply mob rule dressed up in a coat and tie. It’s where a bunch of people—who are marginally competent at running their own individual lives—go to a voting booth to have what H.L. Mencken termed “an advance auction on stolen goods.” Democracy usually winds up turning the State into a vehicle for theft, and making that seem like a good and moral thing...

Democracy—a gentler form of mob rule—is not a good thing. It politicizes the average person and distracts him from running his own life. It focuses his attention on trying to run other people’s lives through elected representatives. Worse, the elected representatives aren’t the best and the brightest.

They’re generally sociopaths who are drawn to power. They’re the worst kind of people, the kind that want to rule other people by winning a popularity contest. This is true in the US and every other place where ballot boxes are used to determine the new ruler.

The winner of an election is typically the most skilled liar. Look at what president Wilson did by pointlessly drawing the US into WWI, while claiming to do the opposite. He said it was all about making the world safe for democracy. In fact, he initiated the long decline of Western Civilization. The French Revolution was based on democracy. It didn’t work out very well. It had a lot to do with democracy—but had nothing to do with freedom. Democracy and freedom are typically at odds with each other.

International Man: Aside from the claim of promoting democracy, the US government and mainstream media also use alleged human rights abuses as a justification for war. The term “human rights” seems to be vaguely defined and inconsistently applied. It seems like more sophistry. What’s really going on here?

Doug Casey: Let me first say, the most important “human right” is simply to be left alone by other people, to be left in peace. Whenever a government gets involved in people’s private affairs it makes things worse. The US government is actually the greatest danger to both world peace and human rights today. It’s quite Orwellian the way most Americans have been propagandized into believing the opposite, like the citizens of Oceania in 1984.

The best thing to do with foreign countries is leave them alone to work things out themselves.

You cannot change a culture. When you try to change a culture, you generally wind up with chaos. That’s what the US government has created in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and everywhere else it sticks its nose. 
International Man: So, do these wars provide a net benefit to the average American?

Doug Casey: No. There’s no benefit at all. The correct U.S. foreign policy is to withdraw all the troops from everywhere in the world. Foreigners don’t want to see American troops on their land any more than Americans would like to see Iranian, or African, or Korean troops parading through the streets and maybe breaking down doors at 3:00 AM. That’s the first thing. If you want to “support the troops” bring all the troops home.

The next step is to cut off all foreign aid, which is really just a transfer program of about $50 billion per year from poor people in the US to rich people in poor countries. It’s almost all skimmed by cronies.

People forget that Osama bin Laden said that he only wanted three things.

First, he wanted infidel soldiers out of the homeland of the prophet, a reasonable request.

Second, he wanted the US to stop replacing Middle Eastern leaders with quislings, and interfering with local politics. Another reasonable request. The US has no more right to interfere in the politics of Middle Eastern countries than Mohammedans would interfering in US politics.

Third, he wanted the US to stop supporting Israel. Once again, a very reasonable request. We should be friendly towards all, but shouldn’t get involved in other people’s local squabbles, regardless of who we think is the good guy or the bad guy at the moment.

Of course, my saying something Osama bin Laden said was reasonable is like saying something that Hitler said was reasonable. But it doesn’t matter who says something. The facts should speak for themselves. And—just to head off hysterics—no, I neither like nor support either Osama or Adolf.

International Man: US foreign policy has serious domestic consequences. After all, “War is the health of the State" as Randolph Bourne said.

Specifically, the rapid rise of the domestic surveillance apparatus, the curtailments of civil liberties, and the turbocharging of militarized local police forces… they’re all connected to US foreign policy.

Related to all this is the inane expression “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” What do you make of all of this?

Doug Casey: Well, if that’s true then John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and the rest of the apparatchiks around the DC Beltway should be happy to post their tax returns on the internet, and have microphones and cameras in every room of their houses. They ought to be perfectly happy when they’re having a private conversation in their living room to have it available to anybody that wants to listen.

The ability to maintain privacy is one thing that separates civilized men from primitives living in mud huts. In a primitive society you have zero privacy, because your neighbors can see and hear absolutely everything that goes on through the paper-thin walls of your hut. Privacy is something that grows with civilization. These people have everything exactly backwards. They’re not just anti-freedom. They’re anti-civilization. They’re the same basic personality type as Stalin, or Ceausescu, or Pol Pot.

International Man: Another arena that has been drastically affected is the airports and the creation of a new federal bureaucracy, the TSA. Thanks to the TSA, everyone knows that “if you see something say something.” That saying is actually a registered trademark of the Department of Homeland Security.

Doug Casey: It's Orwellian. It's the type of thing Big Brother would advise you to do… to report your neighbors to the State for any real or imagined offense.

One time I was in a line that was snaking back and forth at immigration. My briefcase weighed about 25 pounds, so I put it down and left it for about 15 feet so I could pick it up when the line snaked back.

Not once, but twice, somebody looked around like a righteous busybody citizen and said, "Unattended baggage! Unattended baggage!"

These people are really just chimpanzees. They picked up this behavior from the government… monkey see, monkey do. I said to them sarcastically "See something, say something", but they didn't think I was kidding. They thought I approved of what they were doing.

International Man: Do you see this degraded behavior in other places?

Doug Casey: Of all the countries in the world that I’ve traveled to—including backwards hell holes in Africa, Russia, China, it doesn’t matter—going through the US immigration, customs, and TSA, probably provides the most degrading experience. None of these other countries ask you the kinds of questions or seem so anxious to go through your laundry. Although Canada and Australia in particular are closely following the US lead.

The average American has been propagandized into thinking that he lives in the land of the free. As a matter of fact, that’s no longer true.

The US has descended from being a shining beacon—that really was exceptional and different from every other country in the world—to being just another nation state. But, perversely, one that thinks it’s still exceptional. It’s paranoid. It thinks it’s under attack, when actually it’s the attacker.

The whole thing is upside-down, and the average American has absolutely no clue.

It's really shameful that the US has turned into both a welfare state—with about 50% of the population reliant upon the government—and a warfare state. We’re getting the worst of both worlds.

The problem is that when the economy turns down—and it will before Trump leaves office—it’s going to go from being depressing to scary. And if they start a major war, it’s going to go all the way to terrifying, because at that point you won’t have any rights. The average American will approve of it, however. Your life and property are becoming the property of the State.